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INTRODUCTION

Immigration policy is back on the American public's radar screen. The
fields of immigration-a civil-law subject-and criminal law-a publiclaw subject-are quite distinct in both litigation practice and law school
curricula.' With exceptions along the U.S.-Mexican border, only in a
small minority of federal cases do criminal attorneys need to know more
than some very basic premises of immigration law. Aside from some very
general information necessary for defense attorneys to provide adequate
advisements according to Padilla v. Kentucky 2 to their clients before
entering guilty pleas and Continued Legal Education (CLE) training
regarding what offenses have severe immigration consequences, 3 the
1. For example, at the University of Texas, where two of the Authors teach, there has
historically been little, if any, cross-pollination among those professors teaching criminal
law and procedure courses and those running immigration clinics. Immigration is not
mentioned in any of the scores of major first-year criminal law casebooks. See, e.g., GEORGE
Dix, CRIMINAL LAW (7th ed. 2015); SAMFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES (10th ed. 2017); JENS DAVID OHLIN, CRIMINAL LAW: DOCTRINE, APPLICATION,
AND PRACTICE (2016). Moreover, many law schools now offer "Federal Criminal Law" as a
relatively new subject (such courses have perhaps been offered for a decade at most), but
none of the Federal Criminal Law casebooks include a chapter (or even a mention) of
immigration. See, e.g., PETER W. Low, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 2003); JULIE R.
O'SuLLIvAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME (5th ed. 2012). Professor Klein's casebook will
have a brief section on immigration for the first time in the 2019 Supplement and will
include a full chapter on immigration in the seventh edition. See NORMAN ABRAMS, SARA
SUN BEALE & SUSAN RIVA KLEIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAw AND ITS ENFORCEMENT (6th ed.
2015).
2. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
3. In 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States upset years of federal criminal
plea practice by holding that counsel is ineffective when misadvising their clients regarding
the immigration consequences of guilty plea or failing to warn them that their pleas "may
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences" where "the law is not succinct and
straightforward." Id. at 369. These immigration advisements are now part of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 colloquy. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(0) (amended 2013).
With well over 90% of federal convictions resolved through plea agreements, defense
attorneys routinely counsel clients on the impact of waiving rights, and federal district
courts depend upon defendants giving up a myriad of constitutional rights in the name of
expediency. Indeed, the federal courts could not function in their current size and limited
resources if more defendants went to trial. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 2009 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdflfs09.pdf (noting that the
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body of criminal practitioners have very little knowledge of the
labyrinthine immigration law and its even more impenetrable
regulations.
It is not surprising, then, that law schools similarly segregate the two
areas of law. Criminal law is considered a core subject, and the vast
majority of law professors who teach this are tenured or tenure-track
professors. Immigration law, on the other hand, is a subject that may not
yet be considered sophisticated by the academic elite and is not given the
same level of attention. 4 More law schools now offer immigration as a
separate course, in addition (or separate) from an immigration clinic.
While this divide is a topic for another day, it does help explain why
criminal law practitioners and academics are not fully versed in
immigration law, and vice-versa. 5
The distinction is becoming increasingly problematic as the subjects
continue to intertwine in very practical ways: federal criminal
prosecution is now routinely used as part of border enforcement strategy,
and interior immigration enforcement is done largely in cooperation with
state and local policing.6 The Department of Justice (DOJ), under a new
percentage of federal felony convictions obtained by plea soared to 97% by 2009); Santobello
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (describing plea bargaining as "an essential
component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged.
If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal
Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court
facilities.").
4. Over the last decade, we have seen more top-tier law schools, such as Yale and the
University of California, Los Angeles, hire tenure and tenure-track professors who
specialize in immigration law, though this is not yet universal.
5. We are not the first scholars to note the sharp divide between the fields, despite
their commonalities. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacon, ProducingLiminal Legality, 92 DENVER
U. L. REV. 709 (2015); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis:Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 396 (2006) (noting the nominally separate parallel
systems of immigration law and the criminal justice system and suggesting a unifying
theory based upon "membership theory"); Teresa Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent
Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 617 (2003) (noting
the intersection); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts about Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1890, 1894 (2000)
(describing deportation as serving the same goals as criminal punishment: incapacitation,
deterrence, and retribution).
6. Criminal immigration violations are now one of the largest single categories of
federal criminal offenses filed. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2017),
https://www.usse.gov/about/annual-report-2016.
The first federal statute restricting
immigration in 1882 barred the entry of foreigners with certain serious criminal
convictions. In 1929, unlawful entry itself became a federal misdemeanor, and unlawful
re-entry became a felony, and "[i]n 1988 Congress vastly expanded the range of crimes
leading to deportation by creating the category of 'aggravated felon[y]."' Stumpf, supranote
5, at 383. Finally, the events of September 11 had a huge impact on immigration control.
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administration whose goal is to expand and accelerate removal of noncitizens,7 is taking advantage of this historical division.8 Intending to
have its cake and eat it too, the Trump administration wants to retain
the civil aspects of immigration law that most benefit the government
(primarily that a non-citizen has no Sixth Amendment9 right to an
attorney at the government's expense in deportationo proceedings),
while retaining the aspects of criminal law where the government holds
all the cards (namely the coercive aspect of plea bargains that can include
waivers of most of the defendant's substantive and procedural rights)."

&

Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided Prevention:The War on Terrorism as a War on Immigrant
Offenders and Immigration Violators, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 550 (2004).
7. Non-citizens and immigrants refer to individuals who are not United States
citizens. These individuals include both non-nationals lacking immigration status and
those with status, including lawful permanent residents. Citations to federal statute may
use the term alien. For additional discussion on terminology, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY
CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 533 (6th ed. 2015).

In this Article, non-citizen defendant or non-citizen will be used.
8. See Memorandum from Attorney General Jefferson Sessions on Renewed
Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement to All Federal Prosecutors (Apr. 11,
2017) [hereinafter AG Sessions Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/opalpress -release!
file/956841/download [https://perma.cc/SJ4Q-MB56] (providing that criminal cases
charging violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (bringing and harboring aliens), 8 U.S.C. § 1325
(improper entry by alien), 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (reentry of removed alien), 18 U.S.C. § 1028A
(aggravated identify theft), 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other
documents), and 18 U.S.C. § 111 (assaulting, resisting, or impeding officers) are to be
"higher priorities" in deportation proceedings). Moreover, the AG Sessions Memorandum
asks that at sentencing, prosecutors should "seek, to the extent practicable, judicial orders
of removal." Id.; see also Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Immigration Judges Were Always
Overworked. Now They'll Be Untrained, Too, WASH. POST (July 11, 2017), https:/www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/immigration-judges-were-always-overworked-now-theyll-beuntrained-too/2017/07/11/e7lbblfa-4c93-11e7-al86-60c031eab644_story.html?utmterm=
.aelf72c2faca (noting that immigration judges have more than 1500 cases per year with
one law clerk shared by four judges, compared with federal district court judges who have
400 cases per year with three law clerks for each judge, and lamenting that the Trump
administration is both dramatically increasing their caseloads, while at the same time
canceling their annual week-long training conference). This acceleration started with
President Obama; there was a then-all-time high of 267,752 cases pending in 2010 and
more than 542,000 pending cases in 2016.
9. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
10. While the law since 1996 uses the term "removal" to refer to the process of
deportation, the term "deportation" persists in general use and understanding. See
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 1. The terms "removar' and "deportation" could
be used interchangeably for this Article. Thus, we will refer to the various means of an
immigration authority returning non-citizens to their home countries simply as "removal."
11. See generally Susan R. Klein, Aleza S. Remis & Donna Lee Elm, Waiving the
CriminalJustice System: An Empirical and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
73 (2015) (documenting the expansion of government requested waivers, both of trial rights
and non-trial rights, as a condition of entering into a plea deal).
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By combining the greatest pro-government interests of both fields,
*prosecutors are best positioned to reach the current administration's goal
to deport as many immigrants as possible. 12 Although the Authors do not
comment on the propriety of this goal, we do take issue with the
government's illegitimate means of achieving it by including waivers of
immigration relief and challenges to deportability in criminal plea
agreements.
This Article focuses on DOJ's inclusion of waivers of immigration relief
in plea agreements for non-citizen federal defendants and proposes some
challenges to these waivers. Federal district and appellate judges,
immigration judges (IJs), and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
members will find below legal grounds to decline to accept these waivers.
Such tools are critical to combat this new federal immigration waiver
propensity-which is especially disturbing in light of Attorney General
Sessions' April 11, 2017 Memorandum requiring federal prosecutors to
substantially broaden immigration prosecutions, and limiting discretion
on whom not to deport. 13 The government seeks waivers of critical rights
without giving non-citizen defendants access to the tools and knowledge
to make fully informed decisions.
In Part I, we review the language of immigration waivers, which
widely varies by jurisdiction, and include an appended chart tracking
waivers from each U.S. Attorney's Office that presently requests waivers
as part of their standard plea agreements. In Part II, we briefly describe
how removal orders are imposed by immigration judges, Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) officers, and by federal district court judges,
and discuss the effect these waivers will have in those proceedings. The

12. See, e.g., AG Sessions Memorandum, supranote 8; Memorandum from Charles D.
Luckey, Department of the Army, on Certification on Honorable Service Pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1440 to Operational Commands (Aug. 17, 2017) (describing new Army policy
prohibiting reservists from naturalizing under INA § 329); Denise Gilman, The U.S.
DeportationSystem is Verging on Lawlessness, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/23/immigration-crisis-us-deportation-system-la
wlessness-trump-administration (suggesting that the Trump administration has taken an
aggressive stance on immigration enforcement, detaining and seeking to deport in large
numbers, yet has allocated only a fraction of the $1.5 billion promised to immigration
enforcement to the immigration courts).
13. See AG Sessions Memorandum, supra note 8; see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82
Fed. Reg. 8799 § 8 (Jan. 25, 2017) (withdrawing all previous Obama memos outlining
prosecutorial discretion priorities); Memorandum from Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security John Kelly on Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the
National Interest to Kevin McAleenan, et al. (Feb. 20, 2017), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/170220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immi
gration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf (expanding enforcement priorities and
reducing application of prosecutorial discretion).
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Authors also include a discussion of the potential grounds of relief from
removal, such as asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under'
the Convention Against Torture in conjunction with challenging the
grounds for the deportation. Finally, we spend some time on the renewed
use of a 1994 judicial removal statute,1 4 8 U.S.C. § 1228.15
In Part III, we identify five methods for challenging these waivers. We
first urge immigrants to demand hearings and to challenge the factual
statements contained in the plea waivers. Next, we question the
constitutionality of the judicial removal statute. Moving on, we suggest
that defense attorneys who advise clients to sign these waivers may be
providing ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, we note that
ethics rules regarding competency prohibit most criminal defense
attorneys from advising their clients regarding what immigration rights
they are ceding, and similarly, prohibit prosecutors from seeking such
waivers. Finally, we argue that public policy and international law
obligations may prohibit enforcement of these waivers.
I. CURRENT FEDERAL IMMIGRATION WAIVER TERMS

Although federal prosecutors have sporadically included waivers of
immigration relief in their plea agreements for many years (sometimes
in "Fast-Track"16 sentencing agreements for immigrants in the country
unlawfully), those will be used with increasing frequency and greater
substantive breadth now. Given the present administration's

14. "Judicial removal" refers to when a district court judge orders removal as part of a
sentencing hearing. It is distinguished from removal ordered by an IJ as part of
immigration proceedings in her court or administrative removal provided by ICE.
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2018).
16. Fast-Track was a DOJ program developed in the 1990s that offered a significantly
reduced (approximately 50%) sentence for an Illegal Entry or Re-Entry defendant who, very
early in the case, accepted a plea agreement and did not contest matters. It was originally
deployed along the border states, which would otherwise have been overwhelmed with full
prosecutions of the vast number of these defendants. Non-border districts were allowed to
use it as well when they had a large number of these cases. See Memorandum from John
Ashcroft, Attorney General, on Department Principles for Implementing on Expedited
Disposition or "Fast-Track" Prosecution Program in a District to all U.S. Attorneys (Sept.
22, 2003), http://www.1b7.uscourts.gov/documents/09-39321.pdf; see also Memorandum
from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, on Department Policy of Early Disposition
or "Fast-Track" Programs to all U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.justice.gove/
[hereinafter DAG Cole
sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2012/01/31/fast-track-program.pdf
Memorandum]; U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 (Nov. 1, 2015) (authorizing a downward departure of not
more than four levels, on motion of the government, pursuant to an early disposition
"fast-track" program within certain districts, promulgated pursuant to section 401(m)(2)(B)
of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) [hereinafter the PROTECT Act]).
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prioritization of immigration prosecution,17 it is reasonable to anticipate
a greater proliferation not only of prosecutions but also of these waivers
in the near future.
Nevertheless, the DOJ has not offered its prosecutors any standard
language for immigration waivers as of this writing.18 The most recent
policy pronouncements regarding Fast-Track, like the PROTECT Act 1 9
and DOJ's Sentencing Manual, 20 do not address immigration waiver
language; rather, it only requires that the defendant agree to the factual
basis and waive the right to ask for a variance, appeal, and collateral
attack. 21 This relatively recent Fast-Track memorandum does not speak
to removal at all, let alone stipulated removal. In fact, most jurisdictions
do not include any immigration waivers in plea agreements. 22 In those
districts incorporating immigration waivers, a variety of terms are
employed. However, the effect of all these versions is the same: to
circumvent immigration relief from removal, deportation, and exclusion.
A couple of districts use only general terms. For instance, in the
Northern District of Alabama, plea agreements provide: "The defendant
agrees to . . . waive any right he might otherwise have to contest his
deportation and removal to [country of origin]."23 This is similar to the

17. AG Sessions Memorandum, supranote 8.
18. The Chart (appended to the end of this article) summarizes waiver language by
district.
19. Pub. L. No. 108-21 (2003).
20. U.S.S.G. ch. 5 (2018).
21. See DAG Cole Memorandum, supra note 16. But see Plea Agreement at 17 T H,
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (No. 01-595) (agreeing to appear before IJ and
stipulate to entry of an order of removal).
22. At this time, the following districts have not included immigration waivers in their
criminal plea agreement boilerplate: Middle District of Alabama, District of Alaska;
Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas; Central, Eastern, and Southern Districts of
California; District of Colorado; District of Connecticut; District of Delaware; District of
Columbia; Northern and Southern Districts of Florida; Middle and Northern Districts of
Georgia; District of Hawaii; District of Idaho; Northern and Southern Districts of Indiana;
District of Kansas; Middle and Western Districts of Louisiana; District of Maine; District
of Maryland; District of Minnesota; Northern District of Mississippi; Western District of
Missouri; District of New Hampshire; District of New Jersey; Eastern, Northern, Southern,
and Western Districts of New York; District of Nevada; Middle and Western Districts of
North Carolina; District of North Dakota; Northern and Western District of Oklahoma;
Eastern, Middle, and Western District of Pennsylvania; District of Puerto Rico; District of
Rhode Island; District of South Carolina; District of South Dakota; Western District of
Tennessee; Eastern, Northern, and Western Districts of Texas; District of Virgin Islands;
Eastern and Western Districts of Virginia; Western District of Washington; and District of
Wyoming.
23. These plea agreements are summarized in the Chart at the end of this Article.
Complete plea agreements are on file with Author Donna Elm.
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language used in the Eastern District of Tennessee: "The defendant
waives any and all forms of relief from removal or exclusion, and agrees
to abandon any pending applications for such relief and to cooperate with
24
the Department of Homeland Security during removal proceedings."
Most districts, however, particularize their waivers. Three districts
require defendants to explicitly agree to removal. 25 But even when that
is absent, most districts with waivers require defendants to agree or
admit that they are removable. 26 For example, in the District of Arizona,
Eastern District of Louisiana, District of Nebraska, and the Southern
District of Ohio, the "defendant admits that the defendant was the
27
subject of a previous order of removal, deportation, or exclusion."
Similarly, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, a defendant "agrees to" be subject to removal. 28
When there are previous or existing removal orders, some U.S.
Attorney's Offices require defendants to agree to the reinstatement or
29
otherwise not oppose the execution of those orders. Thus, five districts
feature agreement terminology: "defendant agrees to the reinstatement
30
of that previous order of removal, deportation, or exclusion." Taking a
converse approach, three districts feature language such that defendants
may not contest their prior orders; the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan has "defendant agrees not to contest,
obstruct, or hinder in any way, such reinstatement at the end of the term
31
of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this plea agreement," and the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama has
"defendant agrees not to contest, either directly or by collateral attack,

24. Plea agreements on file with Author.
25. The agreements in the Middle District of Florida provide, "[D]efendant agrees and
consents to removal." The agreements in the Northern District of Illinois and the Southern
District of Alabama have virtually identical wording.
26. These terms appear in agreements in the Southern District of Alabama, District of
Arizona, Middle District of Florida, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern District of
Louisiana, Eastern District of Michigan, District of Nebraska, Southern District of Ohio,
and Eastern District of Tennessee.
27. Plea agreements on file with Author.
28. Plea agreements on file with Author.
29. The immigration statute permits previously issued removal orders to be re-used or
"reinstated' against individuals who have reentered the United States unlawfully after
having been removed, without requiring any additional review by the immigration court.
INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2018).
30. Plea agreements on file with Author. The Southern District of Alabama, District of
Arizona, Eastern District of Louisiana, and District of Nebraska have the same precise
language. The Southern District of Ohio and the District of Utah have similar wording.
31. Plea agreements on file with Author.
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the reinstatement of the prior order of removal." 32 Finally, plea
agreements in six districts indicate that the previously mentioned "not
contest" waiver specifically applies to any appeal, collateral attack, or
other review of a prior removal order, referring, for example, to
"defendant will not collaterally attack or contest in any manner
reinstatement of the defendant's prior deportation or removal order." 33
Although several districts use general language to require defendants
not to litigate immigration matters, 34 one of the minutiae that
occasionally arises is waiving particular litigation behavior within
immigration proceedings. The Massachusetts waiver thus particularizes
that a defendant waives "his rights in connection with any
administrative or judicial removal proceeding to examine the evidence
against him, to present evidence on his own behalf, to cross-examine any
witnesses presented by the government, and to appeal from a
determination of deportability or removability."3 5
A few districts include a requirement to abandon immigration cases
that have already been opened and remain unresolved. In the Middle
District of Florida, a defendant must agree to "abandon any pending
applications for relief from removal or exclusion." 36 This is almost
identical to terminology used in the Northern District of Illinois and the
Eastern District of Tennessee.
Massachusetts's plea agreements have additional specific waivers.
Defendants there must agree to forego "any judicial or administrative
stay of execution of the order of removal." 37 Additionally, they also waive
"any right to seek release from the custody of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement when ICE assumes such custody after conviction." 38

32. Plea agreements on file with Author.
33. Plea agreements on file with Author. This is the waiver term found in agreements
in the Eastern District of Louisiana, the District of Nebraska, the District of New Mexico,
and the District of Utah, and is similar to that in District of Arizona and the District of
Massachusetts.
34. This language is present in agreements in the Middle District of Florida, the
Northern District of Illinois, the Southern District of Mississippi, the District of Nebraska,
and the Eastern District of Tennessee agreements. In fact, the waiver in the Southern
District of Mississippi clarifies a number of forms of relief the general waiver of litigation
is geared to "(a) voluntary departure; (b) asylum; (c) withholding of deportation or removal;
(d) cancellation of removal; (e) suspension of deportation; (f) adjustment of status; and (g)
protection under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture." Plea agreements on file with
Author.
35. Plea agreements on file with Author.
36. Plea agreements on file with Author.
37. Plea agreements on file with Author.
38. Plea agreements on file with Author.
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The waivers discussed thus far require foregoing challenges to which
defendants may be entitled. There are also a handful of districts that
offer plea agreements demanding affirmative cooperation with
deportation. Hence, waivers in the Middle District of Florida, the
Northern District of Illinois, and the Eastern District of Tennessee
provide that a defendant must "cooperate with the Department of
Homeland Security during removal proceedings."39 The Massachusetts
version of affirmative cooperation, though, has an additional variant
40
prescribing "surrendering of or any applying for travel documents."
Finally, five districts seek to prevent defendants from specifically
41
invoking asylum or related non-refoulement protections. Four of those
ask the defendants to admit that they do not fear persecution: "defendant
admits that he does not have a fear of returning to the country designated
in the previous order." 42 In the Southern District of Mississippi,

defendants are instead asked to agree that they "[have] not been tortured
43
in, and [have] no present fear of torture in" their country of origin.
Additionally, all of the "not contest" waivers to reinstatement orders may
be understood as waiving rights to persecution and torture-based
protections, given the normal ability to seek relief from removal on those
44
grounds, even where there is an existing prior order of removal.
II. REMOVAL DECISIONS AND IMMIGRATION RELIEF OPTIONS
Why demand immigration waivers? Whether they are effective at
streamlining the process and increasing the number of persons
deported-the express goal of the current administration-depends upon
45
whether these waivers will result in less immigration court litigation.
To understand why the waivers should not be enforced, it is helpful first
to understand what is at stake for non-citizen defendants, the mechanics
of these civil immigration proceedings and their historical context. This

39. Plea agreements on file with Author.
40. The necessity of these provisions is questionable given the non-cooperation
penalties in the immigration statute. INA § 243(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) (2018).
41. Non-refoulement protections refer to withholding of removal and protection under
the Convention Against Torture.
42. Plea agreements on file with Author. This term is found in agreements in the
Southern District of Alabama, the District of Arizona, the Eastern District of Louisiana,
and the District of Nebraska.
43. Plea agreements on file with Author.
44. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2018) (prohibiting removal to a country
where a non-citizen's life or freedom would be threatened); 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(a) (2018)
(providing for a "reasonable fear" interview and, if successful, referral to the immigration
court for adjudication of the protection claim).
45. AG Sessions Memorandum, supra note 8.
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section starts with a brief overview of the most common grounds for
deportation, especially the deportation of federal criminal defendants,
and the available defenses to removal. It will discuss how removal
decisions are made-both in court and in summary administrative
proceedings. It will also explain the limited rights of non-citizens in
removal proceedings, and how the immigration waivers may impact the
exercise of those rights.
46
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) and a smattering

of additional special legislation establish limited categories of
non-citizens who are able to acquire lawful status in the United States,
either on a temporary or permanent basis. 47 In addition to satisfying
criteria of one of these categories, non-citizens generally must show that
they do not meet the criteria of any of the categories of immigrants whom
Congress deemed unwelcome, or inadmissible.4 8 The INA also identified
deportable immigrants, 49 including non-citizen lawful permanent
residents (LPRs) who have been convicted of certain crimes such as an
"aggravated felony."50 Inadmissible and deportable non-citizens are
vulnerable to removal from the United States to their home countries.
51
Importantly, removal is a civil, not criminal, proceeding.
Non-citizens may be removed under the INA because they were not
53
lawfully admitted, 52 have overstayed their period of lawful status, or
54
have violated the terms of their admission. Non-citizens can also be
removed because they are a security threat55 or for a wide variety of
criminal convictions.5 6 Non-citizen defendants most affected by criminal
46. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (2018)).
47. See id.
48. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2018) (listing grounds of inadmissibility, based
primarily upon health, prior criminal history, or security concerns).
49. INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2018) (listing deportability grounds).
50. This term is defined in INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2018); Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (providing for deportability
for single aggravated felony). Definitions of aggravated felony have been changing rapidly
in the federal criminal context given important rulings from appellate courts. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (holding that the residual clause of the
armed Career Criminal Act defining "violent felony" is unconstitutionally vague); EsquivelQuintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
51. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594-95 (1952) (finding no ex post facto
clause application because deportation is a civil procedure).
52. INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2018).
53. INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2018).
54. INA § 237(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (2018).
55. INA §§ 212(a)(3), 237(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3), 1227(a)(4) (2018).
56. INA §§ 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2) (2018).
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immigration waivers are those facing removal based on criminal conduct
and convictions, lack of status, or previous immigration violations.
Although the INA grants the Attorney General and DHS broad
statutory discretion to admit inadmissible non-citizens and to grant
discretionary waivers from deportation to those otherwise deportable,
there are statutory limits.5

7

In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism

'

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)58 and the Illegal
Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).5
Those expanded the definition of aggravated felony to include most
serious state and federal crimes (and arguably many not so serious) 60 and
prevented the AG (and now the Secretary of DHS) from granting most
relief to anyone who has been convicted of an aggravated felony. 6
While the INA establishes a limited number of procedures to decide
removability, it provides significant flexibility to the government as to
whether to pursue deportation in the first place, consistent with
executive branch prosecutorial discretion in its law enforcement
functions. 62 Nothing in the INA mandates that the DOJ or DHS initiate
57. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2018). The Supreme Court noted that between 1989
and 1995, § 212(c) discretionary relief had been granted to over 10,000 non-citizens. INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 (2001).
58. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
59. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
60. There is much debate in the federal circuit courts as to exactly which crimes fit into
one of the twenty categories described in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) as aggravated felonies. That
provision defines aggravated felony to include state or federal murder, rape or sexual abuse
of a minor, serious drug trafficking offenses, money laundering (over $10,000), firearms
offenses, explosives, gambling, violation of RICO (Racketeer Influence and Corrupt
Organizations Act), child pornography, kidnapping, unlawful entry or reentry (after
deportation for an aggravated felony), disclosure of classified information, tax evasion (over
$10,000), felony "crimes of violence," felony theft or burglary, fraud (resulting in loss over
$10,000), failure to appear (when the underlying offense was punishable by five years or
more), felony commercial bribery, perjury, bribery, or conspiracy to commit any of the above
offenses. Prior to 1996, only three crimes were specified as aggravated felonies: murder,
drug trafficking, and illegal trafficking of destructive devices. Jennifer M. Chacon,
Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1844 n.83 (2007).
61. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297; INA § 240(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2018).
62. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489-90 (1999)
(affirming that prosecutorial discretion applies to ICE enforcement activities, such as
whether to place an individual in deportation proceedings); Arizona v. United States, 567
U.S. 387, 396 (2012) (highlighting role of discretion in deportation matters, and noting that
"[r]eturning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has
committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission"); Jason A. Cade,
The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014)
(noting that ICE attorneys have enormous prosecutorial discretion in choosing the 400,000
deportations of non-citizens per year that congressional funding levels permit from the 11
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63
a removal proceeding against any particular non-citizen. For example,
the Obama administration established enforcement priorities,
discouraging enforcement against up to five million non-citizens,
64
including immigrant parents with U.S. citizen children. Favorable
exercise of discretion in the current administration, however, is expected
to be exceptional.65
Non-citizens facing removal have very limited statutory relief
options-even less if they have any criminal history. Statutory relief from
deportation, as opposed to the government exercising its discretion not to
initiate or prosecute a removal, may depend on factors such as hardship
66
to an immigrant's U.S. citizen or LPR spouse, parents, or children,
67
demonstration of
length of residence in the United States,

million estimated unauthorized population in the U.S., plus the millions of additional
lawfully present non-citizens who are potentially removable on the basis of criminal history
and immigration violation; and further suggesting that the ICE officers employ their
discretion more uniformly and frequently).
63. DHS trial attorneys have considerable discretion. They may decline to pursue cases
against particular non-citizens, screen and dismiss cases before they are brought to the IJ,
decline to file the charging document with the court, close or terminate proceedings
administratively and consent to relief, or decline to appeal an IJ decision in favor of the
non-citizen. 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a) (2018) (providing authority to cancel Notice To Appear
(NTA) for legal insufficiency); 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(c) (2018) (providing authority to close or
terminate proceeding administratively); Memorandum from John Morton, ICE Director, on
Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal
of Aliens to all ICE Employees (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/
2011/110302washingtondc.pdf (guidelines for exercising prosecutorial discretion in light of
the fact that the immigration system can process only about 400,000 of the estimated 11
million undocumented persons in the United States per year).
64. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, in a curt, one-sentence ruling, halted that
particular measure of prosecutorial discretion. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2016).
65. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 § 8 (Jan. 25, 2017) (withdrawing all
previous Obama memoranda outlining prosecutorial discretion priorities); Memorandum
from John Kelly, DHS Secretary, on Recession of Memorandum Providing for Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) (June 15, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/15/rescission-memorandum-providing-deferred-actionparents-americans-and-lawful (announcing rescission of the DAPA memorandum).
66. One type of relief is cancellation of removal for certain non-permanent residents,
providing discretionary cancellation of removal where a non-citizen satisfies the hardship
requirement plus has avoided criminal authorities, has good moral character, and ten years
of continuous physical presence in this country. INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)
(2018). A second is called cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents, which
provides discretionary cancellation of removal where a LPR has had some minor offenses,
so long as she has not been convicted of an aggravated felony. INA § 240(a), 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(a) (2018).
67. INA § 240A(a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)-(b) (2018).
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rehabilitation,6 8 service in the U.S. military,69 status as a victim of
domestic violence70 or human trafficking,7 1 or cooperation with law
enforcement as a crime victim.

72

An existing petition from a U.S. citizen

or LPR close family member or employer may also provide relief from
deportation. 73 Eligibility for relief, in general, is extremely dependent on
the unique facts of each case and their interplay with the statutory
requirements.
Three forms of relief are available to non-citizens who fear persecution,
harm, or torture in their home country:

asylum,

74

withholding of

75

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).76 As
will be discussed in Section III.F., these protections from deportation are
grounded in international legal obligations.
Asylum requires that non-citizens prove that they have a "wellfounded" fear of persecution if returned to their native county.7 7 The
persecution must be on account of one of five statutory grounds: (1) race;
(2) religion; (3) nationality; (4) political opinion; or (5) membership in a
particular social group.7 8 The persecution must be committed by the
government or by a non-state actor that the government is "unable or
unwilling" to control.79 A grant of asylum is discretionary and
68. INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a) (2018). Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7, 14
(B.I.A. 1998).
69. INA § 328, 8 U.S.C. § 1439 (2018).
70. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006); INA § 240A(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2018).
71. INA § 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2018).
72. INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2018).
73. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2018).
74. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2018). A year after being granted asylum, a non-citizen
can apply for LPR status. INA § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (2018).
75. INA §§ 241, 243, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3), 1253 (2018). Withholding of removal does
not provide a path to LPR status, and the immigrant can be deported to an alternate
country. See Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 933 (9th Cir. 2004) (indicating that unlike an
application for asylum, a grant of a non-citizen's application for withholding is not a basis
for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status and only prohibits removal of the alien
to the country of risk but not to another country); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(f) (2007); see also
Huang v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that neither withholding
nor deferral of removal prevents the government from removing an alien to a third country
other than the country to which removal was withheld or deferred).
76. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (1984) (adopted by the U.S. Senate via
resolution on Oct. 27, 1990, and President Clinton deposited final ratification with the U.N.
Secretary General on Nov. 20, 1994).
77. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2018).
78. Id.
79. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1982).
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unavailable to most non-citizens with criminal histories. A person who
has been convicted of a "particularly serious crime" is barred from asylum
protection,8 0 as are persecutors of others,8 ' those who have committed
serious nonpolitical crimes abroad, 82 individuals shown to be a danger to
the United States, 83 and individuals who meet the84federal definition of a
"terrorist" or have engaged in "terrorist activity."
Withholding removal is similar to asylum but carries a higher burden
of proof. The non-citizens must show that it is "more likely than not" that
their lives or freedom will be threatened if returned. Unlike asylum,
withholding of removal is non-discretionary and must be granted to
non-citizens who demonstrate that they will face persecution on account
of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group if returned to their home country.85 Nevertheless,
withholding of removal is unavailable to non-citizens who have been
convicted of most serious crimes.8 6
Finally, if non-citizens show that they are more likely than not to be
tortured in their home country, the government must grant CAT relief
from deportation to that country.87 CAT relief requires that the
non-citizen prove the clear probability of torture by, or with the
acquiescence of, the government or a public official acting under color of
law.8 8
In addition to the ordinary factual disputes that must be resolved in
any immigration case, there is serious legal dispute over numerous
aspects of the interpretation of these protections, such as the proper
89
definition of "persecution" in an asylum or withholding claim, and
80. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2018). The Attorney General or
Secretary of DHS has no discretion to grant asylum to a non-citizen convicted of an
aggravated felony. INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (2018); see also 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.13, 1208.13(c) (2018).
81. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
82. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2018).
83. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2018).
84. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v) (2018).
85. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2018); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526
U.S. 415, 419-20 (1999); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n.7 (1987).
86. INA § 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2018).
87. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.17(a), 1208.17(a) (2018); Matter of G-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 36, 367-68
(B.I.A. 2002).
88. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(1), 1208.18(a)(1) (2018); Matter of Y-L- et al., 23 I&N Dec.
270, 285 (A.G. 2002).
89. For example, rape and physical mistreatment have been classified as persecution,
but discrimination and expulsion of Palestinians were not. Compare Matter of D-V-, 21 I&N
Dec. 77 (B.I.A. 1993), with De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 1993), and Matter
of Sanchez & Escobar, 19 I&N Dec. 276, 284 (B.I.A. 1985).
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under what circumstances the torture is sufficiently connected to the
government in a CAT claim.9 0
Assessment of both removability and eligibility for relief is enormously
complex, particularly in the examination of the consequences of a
criminal conviction. Courts have struggled to consistently describe and
apply the INA's various terms of art, including "aggravated felony,"91
"crime of violence," 92 "persecution,"93 and "crime involving moral
turpitude." 94
The INA authorizes limited ways for the government to remove a
non-citizen once she has physically arrived in the United States. Three
are relevant to our discussion.9 5 Most commonly, an IJ will hold a hearing
90. Matter of Y-L- et al., 23 I&N Dec. at 279-85.
91. See supra note 50. The Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on whether a
particular state offense constitutes an aggravated felony is in Esquivel-Quintana v.
Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (holding that conviction under one of the seven state
statutes criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a twenty-one-year-old and an
almost eighteen-year-old did not constitute the aggravated felony of "sexual abuse of a
minor" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) of the INA because under the categorical approach,
sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be under sixteen years of age).
92. Id.; see Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (finding "crime of violence" as defined by 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(b) unconstitutionally vague in the immigration context).
93. See, e.g., Sahi v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 587, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2005) (commenting that
"[this court has not] a clue as to what [the agency] thinks religious persecution is").
94. See Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Law Professors in Support of Petitioner in
Garcia-Martinez v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III, No. 16-72940, Agency No. 091-071-827,
Petition for Review of B.I.A. order to United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(July 27, 2017) (arguing by analogy to the residual clause of the ACCA that had been held
unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)). The
argument was based on the fact that crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) in the INA
lacks a generic offense containing settled and identifiable elements, and that therefore, it
should likewise be declared unconstitutionally vague. See also Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823,
835 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court's holding in Jordan
v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951), that all fraud offenses were crimes of moral
turpitude, was incorrect); Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness
Doctrine, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1127, 1171-75, 1177-79 (2016) (arguing that CIMT and crime
of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) are both unconstitutionally vague).
95. Expedited removal proceedings, another major change stemming from IIRIRA, will
not be addressed in this Article. If an immigrant attempts admission into the country and
an immigration officer determines that the immigrant is inadmissible for lack of visa
documents or misrepresentation, "the officer shall order the alien removed from the United
States without further hearing or review." INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)
(2018). As of this writing, expedited removal generally applies to non-citizens at ports of
entry and non-citizens apprehended within 100 miles of the U.S. border who cannot show
that they have been in the United States for more than fourteen days. Notice Designating
Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 FR 48877 (Aug. 11, 2004). The current administration
may well expand expedited removal to apply nationwide to non-citizens who have been in
the United States for less than two years. See Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, at
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in immigration court to determine removability. 96 The IJ may also be
asked to adjudicate applications for relief. In this situation, assuming
non-citizens have already signed a waiver as part of their criminal plea
deal, the government attorney has several arguments to make: the
waiver is dispositive on the issue of removal; it is at the very least
probative evidence of grounds for removal; the non-citizen has no defense
to deportation; or the non-citizen has no grounds for relief. Alternatively,
ICE officers may use the waiver to pressure the non-citizen to sign a
stipulation of removal requesting the entry of a deportation order without
an appearance before a judge.97
98
A second option, becoming more popular, is administrative removal,
where ICE orders deported non-LPR immigrants who have been
convicted of aggravated felonies after a summary proceeding, without a
hearing before an IJ. This process has also been referred to as
"ministerial removal."99 Under this scenario, if non-citizens sign plea
agreements, including an agreement to be deported, ICE may take the
position that they can be removed with no additional process, meaning
no hearing before an IJ or a federal district judge. ICE may use the
non-citizens' waivers of relief, or stipulations that they do not fear
persecution or torture in their home countries, to avoid providing them
with access to protection hearings.
Third, and still relatively rare, federal district court judges can issue
100
In the few
judicial removal orders as part of criminal sentencing.
situations where this is allowed, prosecutors may use the immigration

11(c) (Jan. 25, 2017) (directing to fully apply expedited removal per INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii),
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2017)). Removal under the Visa Waiver Program will also not
be addressed. INA § 217, 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2018).
96. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2018).
97. INA § 240(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2018). Some refer to this pressure as the "chilling
effect" on the immigrant's ability to challenge deportation. See sources cited supra note 5.
Substantial due process concerns have been raised against this practice. See Jennifer Lee
Koh et al., Deportation Without Due Process, NILC (2011), https://www.nilc.org/2011/09/08/
report-finds-due-process-abuses/.
98. INA § 238(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (2018) (providing for summary deportation of
aggravated felons who are not lawful permanent residents); INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(5) (2018) (providing for summary deportation for individuals who have reentered
illegally after having previously been removed).
99. See Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial
Review of ImmigrationProceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1446 n.167 (1997) (coining term
ministerial removal to describe streamlined procedures to avoid confusion with other
"administrative" and "expedited" removal proceedings under the INA); Margaret H. Taylor
& Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131,
1156-57 (2002).
100. INA § 238(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d)(5) (2018).
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waivers to encourage federal district judges to sign orders mandating
removal without hearing evidence regarding whether the immigrant is,
in fact, deportable or has available relief from deportation. In these
circumstances, the judge may hear no argument about whether the crime
constituted a removable offense, if that is what DHS would have charged,
and also does not hear evidence on defenses, such as relief under CAT or
withholding of removal, or one of the discretionary grounds for relief.
A. Immigration Court Proceedings
Most removal proceedings take place in a hearing before an IJ.101 The
hearings are civil in nature, and immigration courts fall within the DOJ.
IJs are not Article III.judges and are technically DOJ attorneys, but they
are sworn to uphold immigration law and exercise their judgment
accordingly. 102 While civil, these proceedings seem like criminal ones in
many ways. Only DHS can initiate proceedings, asking the IJ to find a
non-citizen removable based on alleged facts and charged violations of
the immigration law. Lower level ICE officers and low-level officers from
other agencies within DHS (like Customs and Border Protection and U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)) are authorized to initiate
such proceedings. 0 3 Moreover, they sometimes initiate these cases
without any attorney's prior review, leaving ICE counsel to prosecute
cases in immigration court that, in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, might have been more appropriately dismissed. 104 In many
cases, the non-citizen does not contest her removability, instead asking
the IJ to rule on her defensive claim of relief. 05 Certain forms of relief
are outside the court's jurisdiction, and the non-citizen may ask for the
101. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229, 1229a (2018).
102. Ethics andProfessionalismGuide for ImmigrationJudges, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR.
REV., https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/05/23/EthicsandProfessio
nalismGuideforlJs.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2018). These courts are extremely underresourced, and would be almost unrecognizable to practitioners used to federal criminal
court proceedings. While the 333 federal IJs have 600,000 cases, there are no court
reporters or law clerks, few bailiffs in the courtroom, no PACER system for tracking cases,
and rarely written opinions. Bob Garfield, The Slow Crisis in American's Immigration
Courts, WNYC (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.wnyc.org/story/crisis-americas-immigrationcourts/. Proceedings are audio recorded. A large portion (40%) of non-citizens there have no
attorney, and of those detained, only 15% have attorneys present. Id.
103. 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2018) (listing officers authorized to issue NTAs); Cade, supra note
62, at 6.
104. Cade, supra note 62, at 16-18 (suggesting that DHS trial attorneys fail to exercise
such discretion because of enforcement bias and excessive workloads).
105. EOIR at a Glance, DOJ, https://web.archive.org/web/20150509002653/https://www.
justice.gov/eoir/eoir-at-a-glance (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) ("In most removal proceedings,
individuals admit that they are removable, but then apply for one or more forms of relief.").
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proceedings to be adjourned, closed, or terminated to allow USCIS to
adjudicate the application.106
Immigration court hearings are most analogous to criminal
prosecutions in the detention of non-citizens during the course of the
proceedings. The immigration statute, like the Bail Reform Act 0 7 in
criminal proceedings, permits the detention of non-citizens charged with
civil immigration violations, and in fact, requires detention without the
possibility of release until the conclusion of proceedings for many
immigrants.10 8 Courts have limited the duration of some forms of
mandatory detention to avoid constitutional concerns. 109 Nevertheless,
detention has significant impacts on both the ability to defend against
DHS's assertions and to advance claims of relief. Over the past two
decades, IJs have been conducting an increasing number of hearings via
video-conferencing for immigrants detained in remote facilities.110
Counsel is not guaranteed by statute or constitution for a non-citizen
in immigration court. The INA provides a right to counsel but not at
government expense. 11 ' Low income immigrants and non-citizens
detained far from cities rely exclusively on pro bono service providers who
may have extremely limited resources.11 2 Hearings themselves must be
fundamentally fair and comport with due process principles.113 The IJ
must advise individuals of their right to counsel (at their own expense),
their right to present evidence, and their right to examine and object to
evidence presented and cross-examine witnesses.11 4 The judge must read
and explain the factual and legal allegations in the charging document
and inform the non-citizen of potential eligibility for relief from removal

106. See, e.g., Matter of Acosta-Hidalgo, 24 I&N Dec. 103 (B.I.A. 2007) (noting that the
immigration court does not have jurisdiction over naturalization applications, and that
under certain circumstances, termination of proceedings would be appropriate).
107. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-56 (2018).
108. INA § 236(a), (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), (c) (2018).
109. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (limiting detention of non-citizens
with a removal order); Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) (limiting
detention of inadmissible non-citizens).
110. Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 Nw. L. REV. 933, 94445 (2015).
111. INA §§ 240(b)(4)(A), 292, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (2018).
112. The IJ is required to inform the non-citizen before the court about pro bono service
providers. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2) (2018).
113. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
114. INA § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.15 (2018). The
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply, there is little discovery beyond FOIA, and the
non-citizen may ask the IJ to issue subpoenas and order depositions but has no entitlement
to them.

858

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

115
(including asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection).
16
Immigration courts provide interpreters to non-English speakers.
Non-citizens have the right to appeal IJ decisions to the BIA, which is
an administrative review body within DOJ.117 The non-citizen may then
pursue further appeal directly to the court of appeals for that circuit but
only to raise questions of law and constitutional issues.11 8 Congress
eliminated habeas corpus as a means to review removal decisions from
an IJ or the BIA through the REAL ID Act of 2005.119
The Authors have not yet found any IJ decisions holding that
immigrants cannot challenge the grounds of removal or defenses to
deportation during a removal hearing because they signed a waiver of
such right in a criminal plea agreement. 120

B. Administrative Removal
Since 1996, the government has enjoyed the ability to use summary
removal proceedings against non-citizens who have been convicted of an
aggravated felony and are not LPRs.121 This administrative removal is a
"paper process," absent any hearing before an IJ or other independent
arbiter. In 2013, DHS issued 9,217 administrative removal orders; use of
this process is expected to increase under the current administration.122
In the administrative removal process, a non-citizen's due-process
rights are significantly limited. They have no judge or neutral arbiter to
hear and review arguments, no right to call witnesses, and-as in
immigration court-no right to government-paid counsel.1 23 Thus, they
115. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a) (2018). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has held that the IJ has a duty to inform the non-citizen of a "plausible ground of
relief which might have been available." United States v. Corrales-Beltran, 192 F.3d 1311,
1318 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Zarate-Martinez, 133 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th
Cir. 1998)). In comparison, several circuit courts have found that non-citizens have no
constitutional right to be informed of the existence of discretionary relief. United States v.
Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2002); see Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425, 430 (4th
Cir. 2002); Oguejiofor v. Att'y Gen., 277 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002); Escudero-Corona
v. Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, 244 F.3d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 2001).
116. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.5 (2018).
117. INA § 240(b)(5)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2018).
118. INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2018).
119. INA § 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2018).
120. There are a few federal district court decisions on similar matters. See discussion
infra Part C.
121. INA § 238(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(1) (2018).
122. PracticeAdvisory: Administrative Removal Under 238(b): Questions and Answers,
NAT'L IMMIGR. PROJECT (Feb. 16, 2017), https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/
practioners/practice-advisories/gen/2017_- 16Febadmin-removal-QA-full.pdf.
123. INA § 238(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(4) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2) (2018).
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may have difficulty establishing that they are a citizen, that they have
other lawful status, or that they were not convicted of a crime meeting
the aggravated felony definition. 124 A low-level DHS officer initiates the
administrative removal and issues the decision.1 25 A non-citizen may
respond to the notice of intent to remove, which contains the factual
allegations and the removability grounds, in writing.1 26 Of course,
non-citizens without counsel may not even realize that they have the
right to contest administrative deportation, and they may not speak
English well enough to take advantage of the opportunity. Only if the
DHS officer finds a genuine issue of material fact, after the immigrant
objects, will the question whether the non-citizen is in fact removable be
referred to an IJ for a full hearing.1 27 The statute bars all discretionary
relief from removal, including adjustment of status.1 28
Importantly, DHS must provide a "reasonable fear" interview to
non-citizens who communicate a fear of persecution or torture in their
home countries.1 29 Again, non-citizens may not appreciate that they have
this right and may not be capable of articulating it without counsel. The
DHS Asylum Office conducts these interviews, screening for likelihood of
torture or persecution upon deportation. If non-citizens demonstrate a
real risk of harm, DHS will refer them to the IJ for a full hearing on their
eligibility for withholding of removal and protection under CAT. 130

124. There are serious due process concerns with this process, as non-lawyer ICE
officers regularly make erroneous determinations whether the convicted offense constitutes
an aggravated felony. PracticeAdvisory: Administrative Removal Under 238(b): Questions
and Answers, supranote 122, at 6-7. This is a legally challenging determination, one that
federal courts have struggled with for decades, involving close scrutiny of the elements of
the crime. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Celaya v. Att'y Gen., 597 F. App'x 79, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2015)
(finding that neither of petitioner's two convictions qualified as aggravated felonies);
Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1572-73 (holding that conviction under one of the seven
state statutes criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a twenty-one-year-old
and someone almost eighteen did not constitute the aggravated felony of "sexual abuse of a
minor"); see also Rebecca Sharpless, Zone of Nondeference: Chevron and Deportationfor a
Crime, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 323, 325-26 (2017) (developing a general jurisprudence of Chevron
and deportation for a crime, arguing for an expansive principle of non-deference in cases
involving ambiguity in the scope of crime-based removal statutes).
125. DHS initiates this procedure by serving Form 1-851, Notice of Intent to Issue a
Final Administrative Removal Order, which contains the factual and legal allegations
against the individual.
126. 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(c)(1)-(2) (2018).
127. 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(2) (2018).
128. INA § 238(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(5).
129. 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(f)(3) (2018).
130. If the asylum officer finds reasonable fear, the officer will refer the case to an IJ for
adjudication only of the withholding or CAT claim, which may then be further appealed to
the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e) (2018).
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In administrative removal before DHS, legal arguments challenging
citizenship status or whether a crime qualifies as an aggravated felony
often fall on deaf ears. 131 Non-citizens may have to resort to federal courts
of appeals to resolve these issues. 132 Absent counsel, these challenges are
almost impossible to pursue.
Given the lack of judicial involvement in the administrative removal
process, the potentially harmful impact of immigration waivers in plea
agreements is enormous. DHS very likely will regard the waivers as
binding and may ignore any protest that a non-citizen files against the
notice of administrative removal. Even where non-citizens claim fear of
torture, the DHS officer may find that their fear is not credible, especially
given their waiver of that relief or stipulation that they are not afraid to
return home in their criminal plea. In these rushed proceedings,
mistakes are inevitable, 133 and the cost to the non-citizen is significant.
C. JudicialRemoval
Since 1941, Congress has arguably provided deportation authority to
federal judges on three separate occasions: (1) 1917 Judicial
Recommendations against Deportation (JRAD); 134 (2) the Sentencing Act
of 1984;135 and (3) the Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994 (amended in 1996).136 In addition, and during this
same time frame, DOJ has promulgated policies for federal plea
agreements that contain stipulations to either administrative or judicial
removal and Fast-Track plea agreements. We will discuss each below.

131. In fact, courts disagree as to whether a non-citizen can even raise legal challenges
in the administrative removal process before DHS. Cf. Malu v. Att'y Gen., 764 F.3d 1282,
1287-89 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a non-citizen must have exhausted administrative
remedies and argued the legal issue before DHS); but see Valdiviez-Hernandez v. Holder,
739 F.3d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that only factual issues may be challenged in
administrative removal).
132. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Celaya, 597 F. App'x at 82 (finding neither of non-citizen's two
convictions to be aggravated felonies).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Cisneros-Rodriguez, 813 F.3d 748, 762 (9th Cir. 2015)
(reversing illegal reentry conviction and finding underlying administrative removal order
"fundamentally unfair" where DHS officer obtained invalid waiver of defendant's right to
counsel, and defendant was thereby wrongly deprived of the opportunity to apply for a U
Visa before an immigration judge); United States v. Reyes, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1071-72,
1080 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding in the context of an illegal reentry prosecution that defendant
had been erroneously charged with and deported under § 1228(b) for possession of a shortbarreled shotgun, and wrongly deprived of the opportunity to apply for voluntary
departure).
134. INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (enacted in 1984).
136. 103 Pub. L. No. 416, 108 Stat. 4305 (1994).
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Between 1917 and 1990, state and federal sentencing judges could
recommend that offenders not be deported despite a conviction for a
CIMT.137 These JRADs were binding on the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) (though it was given notice and the
opportunity to respond) so that INS could not use that particular
conviction as a basis for deportation.1 38 Recommendations from judges
were considered an amelioration of criminal punishment and were based
upon their usual considerations of the defendant's criminal record,
evidence of rehabilitation and remorse, and ties to the community; they
were not based upon the complexities of immigration law. JRAD was
repealed in 1990.139 JRADs were infrequently, or at least inconsistently
used,1 40 in part because the overall level of deportations was very low at
that time and in part because defense attorneys decided not to request a
JRAD from the sentencing judge for fear of flagging their client for INS.
INS opposed JRADs, believing that sentencing judges did not know
enough about immigration law to make deportation decisions.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) provided in part that a court
may impose, as a condition of supervised release after imprisonment,
that a non-citizen defendant be deported. 141 This soon generated a circuit
split regarding whether this language simply allowed the sentencing
judge to order that a non-citizen defendant be transferred after his
sentence is completed to the custody of the INS for traditional
immigration proceedings or whether it further supplanted deportation
proceedings by an IJ.142 The majority of circuits agreed with the first

137. Former 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (2018). In 1956, Congress excluded convictions for narcotics
offenses from the scope of JRAD authority.
138. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4) (2018); see also Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305, 1307-08
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that a JRAD, when timely issued, is absolutely binding on the
Attorney General).
139. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505(b), 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251).
140. In many districts, JRADs were not used at all. On the other hand, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, it was considered ineffective assistance of
counsel not to ask for a JRAD. Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 455-56 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that it may constitute a Sixth Amendment violation not to request a JRAD); but
see id. at 456 (Bartels, J., concurring) ("[I]n my experience as a district court judge, such
requests for a recommendation . .. very seldom have been made in the past.").
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2018) (providing that "[i]f an alien defendant is subject to
deportation, the court may provide, as a condition of supervised release, that he be deported
and remain outside the United States, and may order that he be delivered to a duly
authorized immigration official for such deportation").
142. See breakdown of circuit split in Martin Arms, Judicial Deportation Under 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d): A PartialSolution to ImmigrationWoes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 664 (1997)
(arguing that the minority position is correct).
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option: the SRA allowed the sentencing judge to order that non-citizen
defendants be transferred to the custody of the INS after serving their
sentence, but it did not supplant deportation proceedings before an IJ.143
Only a minority of courts held that the statute implied authority for the
sentencing judge to order deportation as a condition of supervised release
after imprisonment. 144 The DOJ responded with its Criminal Resource
Manual, Section 1922,145 agreeing with the majority that the SRA "does
not authorize a sentencing judge to enter a judicial order of deportation,
and thus does not deprive an alien defendant of his right to an
administrative hearing provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA)."146
Despite § 3583(d) still being in the United States Code, its use as a
method of removal is no longer valid. First, the circuit split regarding
whether it authorized deportation, and the DOJ decision that it does not,
means that federal prosecutors ceased asking district court judges to
enter removal orders as conditions of supervised release at sentencing.
Second, the statute was essentially supplanted in 1994 when Congress
amended the INA to explicitly grant jurisdiction to federal district judges
to directly issue removal orders.1 47 It was amended again in 1996 to
provide that the removal procedures in the INA "shall be the sole and
exclusive procedure" for determining removal, and to allow an alien
defendant to stipulate to the entry of a judicial removal order (JRO) as a
condition of a plea arrangement.148 Federal judges, thus, were no longer
143. These courts reasoned that the minority interpretation contradicted the statutory
language (that a provision of supervised release could provide only that the non-citizen be
delivered to the INS) contradicts Congress'slong tradition of granting the Executive Branch
sole power to instate deportation proceedings, and finally, the minority interpretation
would undermine the procedural protections enshrined in administrative deportation
proceedings and would deprive non-citizens of the opportunity to seek relief from
deportation.
144. Supra note 142.
145. U.S. DEP'T JUST., CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL § 1922.
146. Id. (emphasis in original). DOJ accepted the majority position, as explained in
United States v. Sanchez, 923 F.2d 236, 237 (1st Cir. 1991), and rejected the minority
position as held in United States v. Chukwura, 5 F.3d 1420, 1423-24 (11th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 102 (1994). DOJ has expressly asked its prosecutors to oppose a
sentencing court's entering of an order providing for deportation as a condition of
supervised release. U.S. DEP'T JUST., CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL § 1925. Both these Resource
Manuals are now labeled "Outdated-pending revision."
147. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103416, § 224, 108 Stat. 4305, 4322 (2018) (originally codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1252a(d), and now
codified at INA § 238(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d) (2018)).
148. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (2018) and providing
that INA is the sole procedure for removal; re-codifying former 8 U.S.C. § 1242a(d) to
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authorized to add deportation to their standard federal sentencing
orders. However, some judges order a condition of supervised release,
where if the defendant is deported under the terms of the INA and
returns to the United States without lawful permission, then the
defendant is in violation of the supervised release.149
DOJ's plea and deportation policies were shaped by two critical events
in the late 1980s: the SRA mandate to eliminate unwarranted sentencing
disparities for similarly situated defendants;15 0 and the tidal wave of
federal criminal prosecutions of immigration cases in the border districts
brought on by the congressional expansion of the substantive grounds for
criminal removal and restriction of grounds for discretionary relief.151
One way to curb the takeover of the criminal docket with immigration
matters (to the exclusion of regulatory, corruption, drug, firearms, and
other offenses) was to offer favorable plea agreements. However, offering
better terms to defendants in the southwestern border districts (where
the dockets were overwhelmingly immigration matters) than to
defendants apprehended elsewhere arguably led to unjust sentencing
disparities, and plea agreements in general had little effect in combatting
unlawful immigration. Over time, DOJ issued formal guidance regarding
(1) plea agreements that included "voluntary" deportation of non-citizen
defendants through stipulated removal orders, and (2) Fast-Track plea
policies. In the first instances, prosecutors could offer favorable sentences
in exchange for an agreement to removal. Unlike Fast-Track pleas, these
agreements did not involve an immigration-related offense. In the second
scenario, prosecutors could offer non-citizen defendants a lower sentence

current 8 U.S.C. § 1228; and adding subsection (d)(5), which provides for stipulated judicial
removal).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Soto, No. 99-4241, 2000 LEXIS 19142, at *1
(10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (Criminal judge may punish defendant for contempt of court for
violating terms of Supervisory Release, and government need not file new criminal reentry
action.). See also U.S. DEP'T JUST., CRIM. RESOURCE 1VANUAL §§ 1923, 1924 (providing that
where final deportation order has not been entered by the time non-citizens' term of
imprisonment ends and their period of supervised release is scheduled to begin, or where
non-citizens have obtained relief from deportation prior to the beginning of their period of
supervised release, federal prosecutors should consent to a modification of the terms of
supervised release after consultation with INS District Counsel).
150. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ's Attack on Federal
Judicial Leniency, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Futureof Criminal Sentencing,
44 TULSA L. REV. 519 (2009); Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality
in Criminal Sentencing, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 223 (2003).
151. Susan R. Klein & Ingrid Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalizationof
CriminalLaw, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 83-88 (2012) (noting that immigration offenses comprised
7% of the total federal criminal caseload in 1980, but rose to 29% of the total federal
criminal caseload by 2011).
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in exchange for an agreement to plead guilty very early to an immigration
offense. These latter pleas may or may not have a provision requiring
stipulation to deportation.
We offer here a brief description of these arrangements and a word or
two about their chronology and current status. On April 28, 1995, AG
Janet Reno initially directed federal prosecutors to give a one or two-level
downward departure from the guideline range in exchange for stipulated
administrative deportation-that is, an agreement by defendants to
waive their right to an administrative hearing before an IJ,
administrative appeal, and judicial review of the final order of
deportation.1 52 This memorandum met a chilly reception from most
federal prosecutors and INS. Its guidance was essentially repealed in a
November 1997 memorandum from John C. Keeney, Acting Assistant
Attorney General.153 DOJ stated that this revocation was based primarily
on a case called United States v. Clase-Espinal,154 which stated that a
sentencing judge has no authority to depart downward under the
sentencing guidelines in exchange for stipulated administrative
deportation, unless the defendant can demonstrate a "non-frivolous"
immigration defense that she proposes to waive. 155 DOJ also based it
upon the 1996 IIRIRA, providing for reinstatement of prior deportation
and the administrative removal without a hearing of non-LPRs who are
convicted of aggravated felonies. Moreover, federal prosecutors seemed
to prefer to leave the matter of deportations to INS.156 In fact, since 1996,
federal regulation has provided that INS (now DHS) is not bound by plea
agreements unless the agency authorizes them in writing first.15 7
The DOJ had more success with Fast-Track pleas. The sheer number
of immigration cases in border jurisdictions required early disposition of
these cases. Nevertheless, Fast-Track programs fostered sentencing
disparity between those living within and without such districts. By
enacting § 401(m)(2)(B) of the PROTECT Act of 2003,1ss Congress
attempted to harmonize the sentencing guidelines with these programs.
It instructed the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a downward
152. U.S. DEP'T JUST., CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL § 1921 (containing Memorandum from
Attorney General Janet Reno issued in 1995 directing federal prosecutors not to pursue
contested judicial removal orders.).
153. U.S. DEP'T JUST., CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL § 1999.
154. 115 F.3d 1054 (1st Cir. 1997).
155. Id. at 1059.
156. Professors Taylor and Wright noted in 2002 that the INS and the DOJ "remain
content to process their cases on separate tracks, where each maintains full control." Taylor
& Wright, supra note 99, at 1168.
157. 28 C.F.R. § 0.197 (1996).
158. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003).
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departure for any "early disposition program authorized by the Attorney
General." 15 9 On September 22, 2003, AG John Ashcroft issued a
memorandum authorizing a Fast-Track program where the district
confronts an exceptionally large number of a specific class of offenses that
are highly repetitive and present substantially similar fact scenarios, and
do not involve a crime of violence. 6 0 The current United States
Sentencing Guidelines grants up to four levels of departure in base
offense level for agreeing to plead guilty very early in the process, and
waiving both direct appeal and collateral attack. 161 Neither the Ashcroft
memorandum nor an affirming 2012 memorandum drafted by Deputy
AG James M. Colel 62 mention removal as a necessary (or even optional)
16
requirement of a Fast-Track plea. 3
Judicial removal was authorized pursuant to the 1994 amendment to
the INA, now codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d), giving federal district judges
jurisdiction to enter removal orders against deportable non-citizens at
the time of sentencing. 164 It authorizes-but does not mandate-this
procedure.165 However, that authorization applies only when the order is:
(1) requested by the U.S. Attorney; (2) the U.S. Attorney has the
concurrence of the "Commissioner;"16 6 and (3) the judge chooses to
exercise such jurisdiction.16 7 Judicial removal orders may not be imposed

159. Id.
160. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, on Department Principles for
Implementing on Expedited Disposition or "Fast-Track" Prosecution Program in a District
to all U.S. Attorneys (Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.1b7.uscourts.gov/documents/09-39321.pdf.
161. U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 (2015).
162. DAJ Cole Memorandum, supranote 16. The only revision was to establish uniform
requirements for Fast-Track treatment wherever defendants are prosecuted so they are not
being treated differently depending upon where they are sentenced.
163. Fast-Track requirements in the Cole and Ashcroft Memoranda included that
non-citizen defendants agree to the factual basis in their plea, that they agree not to file
Rule 12(b)(3) motions, and that they waive the opportunity to file a direct appeal or
collateral attack. The memoranda offered nothing concerning stipulated judicial or
administrative removal orders. But see Ruiz Plea, supra note 21, (combining Fast-Track
and administrative deportation provisions. Ruiz did not object to the deportation provision,
and the Supreme Court did not discuss it).
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d) (2018).
165. Id.
166. In 1994, when this statute was enacted, there was a Commissioner of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. However, in 2003, in response to the
September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress created the DHS and dissolved the INS,
distributing immigration enforcement functions to ICE. Because DHS is a cabinet-level
agency, the head is the "Secretary," not the "Commissioner." Presumably, prosecutors
would now seek permission from the Secretary of DHS rather than the Commissioner of
the INS.
167. INA § 238(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d) (2018).
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unless the U.S. Attorney files a notice to request judicial removal before
commencement of the trial or entry of the plea, 168 files a charge
containing the factual allegations regarding the alienage of the
defendant, and identifies the crime rendering the defendant
deportable. 6 9 Once these procedures are followed, if the judge
determines that the defendant presents "substantial evidence . . . for
relief from removal under this [chapter], the Commissioner shall provide
the court with a recommendation and report regarding the alien's
eligibility for relief."170 Then, the judge will grant or deny the relief
sought. 17 1 A judicial order to that effect may be appealed to the court of
appeals.1 72 Further, the 1996 amendment to this statute contained in the
IIRIRA permits the U.S. Attorney, with the concurrence of the INS
Commissioner, to enter into a plea agreement that includes a provision
by which defendants will waive their right to notice and a hearing under
this section, and "stipulate to the entry of a judicial order of removal from
the United States as a condition of the plea agreement or as a condition
of probation or supervised release, or both."173
From the outset, there was little executive branch or judicial
enthusiasm for this statute.1 74 INS authorized very limited use of judicial
deportation procedures only in "the least complicated cases." 75 Likewise,
DOJ issued a memorandum warning against judicial removal. It noted
that ambiguities in 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) "may make implementation
problematic, and that the Department would propose corrective
legislation as needed."' 7 6 Such legislation was, however, never enacted.
In light of these concerns, and "[i]n order to maintain a consistent
national immigration policy," the DOJ's guidance provides that "close
168. INA § 238(d)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d)(2)(A) (2018).

169. INA § 238(d)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d)(2)(B) (2018).
170. INA § 238(c)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d)(2)(C) (2018).
171. Id.
172. INA § 238(d)(3)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d)(3)(A)(i) (2018).

173. INA § 238(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d)(5) (2018).
174. See Taylor & Wright, supra note 99; U.S. DEP'T JUST., CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL §
1921. The 1995 version of this memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno directed
federal prosecutors not to pursue contested judicial removal orders.
175. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, INS Commissioner, to District Directors,
Guidance re: Judicial Orders of Deportation (Feb. 22, 1995).
176. U.S. DEP'T JUST., CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL § 1919. DOJ noted that these
ambiguities included "(1) uncertainty as to the scope of the court's authority to order judicial
deportation, (2) uncertainty as to whether Congress intended an appeal of a judicial
deportation order to be separate from the underlying criminal appeal, and (3) uncertainty
as to whether a denial of a request for judicial deportation, on the merits, precludes further
administrative deportation proceedings against the alien based on principles of res
judicatalcollateral estoppel." Id.
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questions" should be decided before IJs, and judicial "deportation should
not be sought if the alien has any colorable claim for relief from
deportation."1 7 7 INS wanted to retain jurisdiction over deportation;
federal prosecutors wanted uniform national policy on immigration
decided by a single agency. Neither INS nor federal prosecutors wanted
the responsibility to educate district court judges on the intricacies of
178
Furthermore, DOJ did not want
immigration law and policy.
which they do have in criminal
attorneys,
to
have
non-citizen defendants
orders have been imposed. 179
removal
judicial
few
sentencing. Thus, very
As a government bulletin authored by ICE legal counsel recently noted,
even among veteran prosecutors and immigration attorneys, judicial
removal orders are so rare that "[m]any attorneys have never heard of
them."180 This same government report notes that every one of the few
judicial orders of deportation the Authors located are stipulated judicial
orders, rather than what they term "unilateral judicial removal orders"
where the defendant receives notice, an evidentiary hearing, and a
decision on the merits. 181
Just as plea agreements with stipulated administrative removal were
essentially rejected by DOJ policy, so too were plea agreements with
stipulated judicial deportation orders originally disfavored. The DOJ, in
the same Criminal Resource Manual mentioned above, indicated that
stipulated judicial removal should be sought, under its interpretation of
the removal statute, only if the offense the defendant pled to is the one
that caused the defendant to be deportable, and then only with close
coordination with INS. 182 However, also as mentioned above, ICE has
very recently begun to encourage the use of stipulated judicial removal
orders as one method for avoiding the "arduous requirements for
prosecutors seeking unilateral JROs, including proving the defendant is
subject to deportation, addressing whether the alien is eligible for 'relief
18 3
from deportation,' and certain specialized evidentiary parameters."
DOJ should have stuck to its guns, or more precisely, its guidance. We
have found one older and one recent instance of judicial removal, both
DEP'T JUST., CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL § 1928.
178. Taylor & Wright, supranote 99, at 1157.
179. For example, in 1998, only 130 out of 160,000 criminal removals were by judicial
order. This decreased to sixty-eight in 2001. Id. at 1156 n.98.
180. See Marty D. Ryan & Jonathan S. Needle, Stipulated JudicialRemoval Orders,
U.S. ATT'YS BULL., July 2017, at 111.
181. Id. at 113 n.13.
182. U.S. DEP'T JUST., CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL § 1929.
183. See Ryan & Needle, supra note 180, at 111-12 (noting that a stipulated judicial
removal order "provides enormous value to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and furthers new Department of Justice policy").

177. U.S.
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rendered prior to the recent ICE publication we mention above and both
involving stipulated rather than contested judicial removal. These cases
give us serious pause. The government infamously used judicial
deportation after a May 12, 2008, ICE raid on a kosher meatpacking
plant in Postville, Iowa. 184 Prosecutors from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Iowa entered into plea agreements to
aggravated identity theft185 or use of false employment documents18 6 with
almost 300 Guatemalan workers. 187 Those agreements included three
things: (1) a waiver of the right to a hearing before an IJ concerning
removal; (2) stipulation to entry of a judicial order of removal in
accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c); and (3) a promise never to unlawfully
reenter the United States.18 8 Most of these defendants received a fivemonth sentence189 and were then immediately deported to Guatemala. 190
This generated a huge amount of adverse publicity,1 91 and the Obama
administration has since cut back on mass raids on workplaces. 192

184. See generally Sioban Albiol, R. Linus Chan & .Sarah J. Diaz, Re-Interpreting
Postville: A Legal Perspective, 2 DEPAUL J. Soc. JUST. 31, 32-39 (2008).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2018).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2018).
187. This was prior to the Court's holding in Flores-Figueroav. United States that a
conviction for aggravated identity theft requires proof that the defendant knew that the
document belonged to another person. 556 U.S. 646, 647 (2009).
188. Albiol et al., supra note 184, at 34 n.9; see also Julia Preston, 270 Illegal
Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2008, at A-10; Iowa
Immigration Raids Threaten Town's Stability, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2008. Though the plea
agreements were sealed, one redacted agreement can be found online. Postville Raid Plea
Agreement, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS'N, http://www.aila.org/infonet/postville-raid-pleaagreement (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
189. With such a brief sentence, they likely were all sentenced to "time served" by the
time they got to sentencing.
190. Albiol et al., supra note 184, at 35.
191. Congress not only investigated this "cattle call" system of justice, but the judge in
charge of all of these judicial removal proceedings may have erroneously failed to recuse
herself. See Samantha Michaels, A Federal Judge Put Hundreds of Immigrants Behind
Bars While her HusbandInvested in PrivatePrisons, MOTHER JONES MAG. (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2017/08/a-federal-judge-put-hundreds-of-immi
grants-behind-bars-while-her-husband-invested-in-private-prisons/ (noting there was an
independent investigation initiated by former DAG Philip Heymann, in which ethical
experts from the DOJ and the FBI commented upon the impropriety of the judge for failing
to recuse herself because her husband had purchased additional stock in two private prison
companies shortly before the Postville raids).
192. In contrast to large-scale workplace raids, the Obama administration used
company audits to enforce immigration policies. Julie Preston, Illegal Workers Swept From
Jobs in 'Silent Raids,' N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/10/
us/10enforce.html.
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A very recent resort to judicial deportation took place in the wake of
immigration
prioritizing
memorandum
2017
April
Sessions'
prosecutions. This memorandum, for the first time, instructed federal
prosecutors to "seek, to the extent practicable, judicial orders of removal"
at sentencing.1 93 Since this policy change, there have been a few Miami
judges who have ordered removal at sentencing when the underlying
criminal charge was smuggling, and the non-citizen defendants had been
living outside the United States.1 94 However, rather than following the
"arduous" procedures mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c), the government
either bypassed such requirements, notably the requirement of early
notice of judicial removal that is supposed to occur before any plea or
trial, or obtained later blanket waivers of all such requirements from the
defendant. In United States v. Hernandez,9 5 Hernandez was charged
with smuggling goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554. He signed a plea
agreement with a standard Padilla warning on January 27, admitting
guilt and agreeing to a reduced sentence. 196 On April 9, he signed a new
statement in support of judicial removal, waiving all rights, waiving all
future forms of relief, and stipulating to the entry of judicial removal
order.' 97 The sentencing judge, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c), ordered
Hernandez "removed from the United States to Venezuela promptly upon
his sentencing, which removal is to be effected upon completion of his
term of incarceration."19 8 Moreover, that removal order stated the
non-citizen defendant "waived his right to notice and a hearing under 8
U.S.C. § 1228(c)," though no such waiver was in his original written plea
agreement.1 99 The Assistant U.S. Attorney filed a notice and motion to

193. See AG Sessions Memorandum, supra note 8. Finally, it directs every U.S.
Attorney's Office to designate a Border Security Coordinator responsible for convening
meetings with representatives from the Department of Homeland Security-including
Immigration and Customs Enforcement-to accomplish this new criminal enforcement
effort.
194. See United States v. Hernandez, Case No. 1:16-cr-20904-RNS (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10,
2017).
195. Case No. 1:16-cr-20904-RNS (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2017).
196. Id. PACER at document 41, entered on FLSD Docket 1/27/17, at 10-11 ("Removal
and other immigration consequences are the subject of a separate proceeding, however, and
defendant understands that no one, including the defendant's attorney or the Court, can
predict to a certainty the effect of the defendant's conviction on the defendant's immigration
status . . . ."). Similar plea agreements were signed by Hernandez' co-defendants, Sanchez
and Morales, which were followed by identical judicial deportation orders against them.
197. Id. PACER on April 9, 2017, stating that "I will accept a written order issued by
this court for my removal from the United States to Venezuela, and I waive any and all
rights to challenge any provision of this agreement in any U.S. or foreign court or tribunal."
198. Montilla Hernandez, Removal Order (Apr. 10, 2017).
199. Id.
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request judicial removal, together with a notice of the factual allegation,
on April 10, 2017, dated April 9, 2017.200 The judge's previous orders
typically ordered foreign defendants to surrender to immigration
authorities for deportation proceedings after completion of their prison
terms. 20 1 That type of order would have sent the non-citizen defendant to
an immigration detention center to await proceedings in immigration
court; it would have allowed the non-citizen defendant to contest the
grounds for removability and to offer grounds for relief. The judge's
April 10, 2017 order in the Hernandez case was a marked change,
completely circumventing the immigration court. The defendant's
waiver, coupled with the government's backdating of a document,
avoided compliance with all formal notice and hearing requirements of 8

U.S.C. § 1228(d).
ICE now suggests that stipulated removal orders can be used to avoid
the time and resources necessary to secure removal orders through
immigration proceedings, to reduce detention costs, and to avoid future
habeas litigation related to prolonged immigration detention. 202 A
Government Accountability Office report issued in June 2017 showed
that backlogs (more than 500,000 cases pending) in immigration court
are now so long that it takes years for a deportable immigrant to receive
a decision from an IJ.203 On the other hand, the Department may just
wish to send a message. Nevertheless, expediency is no substitute for
following the statutory requirements in a country priding itself on its
reliance on the rule of law. But even if a district court judge issues
removal orders to facilitate prompt removal, it remains to be seen
whether non-citizen defendants will actually be deported with no
additional process, especially if they attempt to contest these orders on
the grounds that they did not receive due process; that the process was
defective for violating the statute; that the judicial removal statute was
unconstitutional; that the waivers were involuntary or not intelligently
entered; that they are the product of ineffective assistance of counsel; and

200. Id. PACER on Apr. 10, 2017.
201. Alfonso Chardy, Federal Prosecutors Inaugurate 'Express' Deportations, MIAMI
HERALD (June 19, 2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article
156656224.html.
202. See Ryan & Needle, supra note 180, at 118; Taylor & Wright, supra note 99
(suggesting that a merger of immigration deportation and criminal sentencing proceedings
will better identify deportable non-citizens, yield less duplication or resources, and lead to
quicker deportations and lower detention costs).
203. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Immigration Courts, Actions Needed to Reduce
CaseBacklog and Address Long-standingManagementand OperationalChallenges, Report
No. GAO-17-438 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685022.pdf.
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that they violate public policy. We advance these grounds further in Part
III of this Article.
III. SECURING IMMIGRATION RELIEF DESPITE PLEA WAIVER

There are numerous sound reasons for ICE officers, IJs, and federal
district judges to not enforce federal immigration waivers and for the BIA
and the federal courts of appeals to review the waivers critically. We offer
six primary challenges that non-citizens may be able to raise against
these waivers: (1) the immigrant has a right to a hearing, despite the
waiver, and can marshal evidence against its reliability; (2) the judicial
removal statute was not properly followed and is constitutionally
questionable; (3) the defense attorney who advised signing the plea
agreement provided ineffective assistance of counsel, a corollary to a
Padilla advisement failure; (4) the waiver violates public policy; (5)
ethical obligations prevent prosecutors from introducing waivers and
defense counsel from advising on waivers; and (6) the waiver violates
international law obligations. Which type of challenge a non-citizen
defendant (hopefully with the aid of an immigration or defense attorney)
will use may depend in part upon the forum in which the waiver is being
challenged-before an IJ during a removal hearing, before a federal
district judge in a collateral attack on the order or upon sentencing,
before an appellate judge after a judicial removal order, or before an ICE
officer in an administrative removal-as well as the immigration relief
sought.
A. Non-citizen Defendants Should Insist on their Hearing in
Immigration Court Despite the Waiver
Non-citizen defendants have tools to fight these waivers. Non-citizens
who have a federal criminal conviction for a misdemeanor or
non-aggravated felony are generally transferred into ICE custody per a
detainer after their sentences. 204 ICE cannot deport a non-citizen without
a removal order. 205 This order may be issued by an IJ in a removal
proceeding. 206 During the hearing, the non-citizen can contest the
removal grounds and, if eligible, apply for relief. The ICE attorney
prosecuting the case may argue before the court that the signed
immigration waiver in the federal plea agreement is dispositive on the
issues of removability and relief. Immigrants and their counsel, if any,
can respond with several arguments.

204. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2018).
205. INA § 241(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2018).
206. INA § 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1).
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As with any waiver, the non-citizen defendant can challenge any
presumption that it was knowingly and voluntarily entered. 207 Most
significantly, the limited or lack of access to competent immigration
counsel to advise on the consequences of the plea terms raises a potential
challenge to voluntariness in almost every case. Moreover, criminal
defense attorneys should ensure that objections to the plea terms are
made on the record to support their client's later arguments in removal
proceedings.
As a question of evidence, the waiver is not dispositive and represents
no more than a prior inconsistent statement-one, incidentally, that may
have been made upon deficient advice. Assessing the reliability of prior
statements is a routine matter for an IJ. Courts regularly review
statements made by non-citizens seeking entry into the United States at
airports and other border entries as well as from previous administrative
interviews. The reliability of these prior statements-even those denying
any fear of persecution or torture-is often very low. 208
Certainly, the waiver's language (for example, the non-citizen
defendant will not contest deportation or has no reasonable fear of
persecution in home country) may influence the outcome. It is merely
"some evidence" of the issues that must be decided in removal
proceedings. 209 Guilty pleas should not foreclose matters collateral to the
elements of the offense of conviction. So, claims such as ones about

207. We are aware of one case where a plea-based immigration waiver was challenged
in subsequent immigration court proceedings. The IJ found that the non-citizen lacked
competency to understand the nature of the civil hearings following Matter of MAM, 25
I&N Dec. 474, 484 (B.I.A. 2011), which requires IJs to screen for competency and provide
safeguards to ensure due process in the proceedings, where competency is deficient. Due to
the findings of mental impairment, the court ignored the waiver.
208. See, e.g., Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding airport
statement unreliable); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 476-77 (3d Cir. 2003); Matter of
H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337, 341 n.3 (B.I.A. 1996) (giving no significant weight to interview
statement taken in English when English was limited). See also ALLEN KELLER ET AL.,
STUDY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, As AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 605 OF
THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 1998: EVALUATION OF CREDIBLE FEAR
REFERRAL IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL AT PORTS OF ENTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (Feb.
2005) (describing a pattern of incomplete or erroneous transcription of interviews).
209. See ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., 18B FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 4474.1 (2d ed. Apr.
2017) (noting that a guilty plea does not rest on actual adjudication or determination of any
issue, so it cannot act as issue preclusion); FDIC v. Oldenburg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1539-40 (10th
Cir. 1994) (admissions regarding intent at plea hearing were relevant though not
conclusive); Chavez-Reyes v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 2014) (BIA properly considered
plea to possession of cocaine where conviction was reversed based on illegal traffic stop).
The Court in Chavez-Reyes held that "[a]s a general rule, a voluntary guilty plea to criminal
charges is probative evidence that the petitioner did, in fact, engage in the charged activity,"
though the court did not decide whether the plea alone would support such a finding. Id.
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persecution in an immigrant's home country, which do not concern the
criminal offense to which the immigrant pled guilty, should not be relied
upon at the later deportation proceedings. 210 Immigrants and their
attorneys must not hesitate to challenge the "facts" from their plea
agreements.
Non-citizen defendants who otherwise have the opportunity to be
heard in an immigration court proceeding may certainly be "chilled" from
pursuing it by ICE agents who can point to their plea agreement
immigration waiver. Indeed, non-citizen defendants' understanding of
their plea agreement may lead them to believe that they must agree to a
quick removal, despite their entitlement to contest removal. Our hope
lies first with IJs who refuse to issue stipulated removal orders without
the non-citizens' appearance to ensure that they made a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver; and with legal service providers who
advise immigrants against waiving their rights to pursuing immigration
relief.
Even in the context of administrative removal or reinstatement,
non-citizens who fear that they will be tortured or persecuted on account
of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group have the right to seek relief from removal. 211 Here,
too, non-citizens' plea agreement waivers of the right to contest removal,
depending upon its language and whether it was entered voluntarily,
might be evidence against their claims presented to DHS or the IJ.
However, the waiver does not preclude them from being heard.
B. Non-citizen Defendants Subject to JudicialRemoval Orders Should
Contest the Procedure
An expedited judicial removal, like the ones done in these recent
Miami cases, creates other problems as well. First, the judicial removal
provision may not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Second, those
immediately deported after judicial removal may not have their asylum,
withholding of removal, or CAT claims heard. Third, federal district
judges are not immigration experts, and thus, may not be able to
sufficiently and accurately review the rights being waived. Finally, the
statutory prerequisites for judicial removal may not have been satisfied
so as to authorize judicial removal.

210. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 317-18 (1983) (where the defendant pled guilty
to manufacturing phencyclidine and then brought a civil rights suit against the police
officers, he was not precluded from the litigation because the Fourth Amendment issues
had not been litigated and were not necessary to the decision to accept the plea offer).
211. INA § 238(b), 8 U.S.C § 1228(b) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(f)(3) (2018) (referral to
Asylum Officer for "reasonable fear" interview); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31, 241.8(e) (2018).
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Judicial removal ultimately may not be legal. First, scholars have
noted for years that Congress, in the judicial removal statute, provided
for "one-way res judicata." That is, under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d)(4), the
government can initiate removal proceedings in immigration court or the
administrative removal process if the request for a judicial order of
212
On the other
removal is denied, regardless of the reason for the denial.
hand, the immigrant-defendant cannot argue in that later immigration
court hearing or administrative removal process that the federal district
judge's denial of the government's removal request be given preclusive
effect against the government. Creating res judicata arguably violates
Article III of the U.S. Constitution 213 when it only benefits the
government. 214 In essence, it provides the judge's decision to order
removal res judicata effect, binding both parties to a decision unfavorable
to the defendant, whereas a decision favorable to the defendant enjoys no
such effect. 215 As Professor Neuman has noted, "If judicial orders of
removal are exercises of Article III judicial power, then that interference
with their preclusive effect violates 'the principle that Congress cannot
vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the
Executive Branch."' 216 By failing to give the judicial denial preclusive
effect, and allowing the government to reconsider and perhaps reverse a
judicial ruling, the statute permits the executive branch to review the
judicial one, in direct violation of Article 111.217 The judicial removal
statute consequently may be constitutionally flawed at its core.
Second, once a judicial removal order has been entered, non-citizen
defendants may be deported without an opportunity to raise new CAT
claims or address relief options that may have developed while they
served their criminal sentence. Depending on the length of the sentence,
it is conceivable that personal circumstances or changes in home country
may generate new forms of relief. The situation for Venezuelans, for
212. As originally enacted, the denial of a removal request without a decision on the
merits of a request for a judicial order of removal would not preclude the Attorney General
from initiating an administrative removal request on the same ground. The statute was
amended in 1996, so that no denial by the judge is given preclusive effect, regardless of
whether that denial was on the merits or simply because the judge declined to exercise
jurisdiction over the request.
213. U.S. CONST. art. III.
214. Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78 TEx. L. REV.
1661, 1688-94 (2000).
215. Id. Both parties can appeal the district judge's decision to the court of appeals, but
that is a separate point from res judicata.
216. Id. at 1690.
217. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995). In analogous JRAD
cases, discussed supra section II.C., rulings regarding deportation were judicial acts with
preclusive effect. See, e.g., United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 6-8 (9th Cir. 1994).
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example, went from distressing to dire at the end of July 2017, with
targeted, state-sponsored violence against opposition political
candidates. 218 A defendant who had a low risk of harm upon return to
Venezuela a few months before, and either stipulated to judicial removal
or declined to seek any relief, may now have viable concerns of
individualized violence. The judicial removal statute, however, provides
no mechanism to vacate the order and reopen the judicial proceedings to
pursue protection.
Third, both DOJ and district court judges have long avoided judicial
removals precisely because the lawyers and judges generally have
insufficient expertise to navigate the immigration code and regulations.
Explaining the rights that are being waived alone is daunting to the
non-expert. Moreover, full evidentiary hearings are available to
defendants during judicial removal proceedings, and few criminal
practitioners and judges grasp the standards, legal issues, discretionary
authority, and many options available for full and meaningful hearings.
In short: IJs know this field, district court judges often do not. Thus,
judicial removal is ripe for reversal.
Fourth, there are a number of prerequisites to judicial removal. 219
Certainly in the Miami cases discussed above, those were not followed.
Judges are not authorized to sua sponte proceed with removal;
prosecutors must request it. 220 Additionally, the government must file a
written notice of its intent to request judicial removal, either before trial
or change of plea. Those notices must also contain a recitation of facts
establishing that the non-citizens have no legal status in this country and
have been convicted of crimes that qualify for removal. This is basic
"notice pleading."
Finally, the "INS Commissioner" must approve, in consultation with
the AG, of using judicial removal in each case. 221 There was no revision
of the removal statute when the INS was eliminated by the Homeland
Security Act (HSA) in 2002.222 Thus, there is currently no INS
Commissioner to offer the necessary pre-approval that the statute

218. Chris Kraul & Mery Mogollon, Nine Reported Dead, Including One Candidate, as
Violence Erupts over Venezuela's Constitutional Vote, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2017.
219. See INA § 238(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d) (2018).
220. There is one contrary decision to note. In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit found harmless error where the court had overstepped its authority
and failed to follow all prerequisites of the statute. See United States v. Nguyen, 255 F.3d
1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Because the defendants have not demonstrated that the
Government's failure to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(B) affected.their substantial
rights, we reject the defendants' challenges to the orders of deportation.").
221. INA § 238(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d) (2018).
222. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 291).

876

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

requires. 223 While the HSA does provide that references to an agency that
224
is transferred to the DHS shall be deemed to refer to the Department,
and that "function[s] transferred by or under this [Act] . . . shall be
deemed to refer to the Secretary, other official, or component of the
225
this is general
Department to which such function is so transferred,"
removal
judicial
separate
to
the
is
targeted
it
of
none
and
language,
requests
approve
to
authority
transfer
to
intend
Congress
statute. Did
for judicial removal from the Commissioner of the INS, an agency head,
to the Secretary of DHS, a cabinet-level position, and, if so, did it do so
clearly enough? We could find no case law concerning substituting the
Secretary of DHS for the Commissioner of the INS, nor any DOJ
226
guidelines explaining the change.
C. Non-citizen Defendants Should Contest Waivers in Plea Agreements
Due to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel apply to
advice given regarding whether a plea to a given offense would affect the
that
Noting
potential.227
deportation
defendant's
non-citizen
punishment
criminal
to
related
intimately
are
consequences
immigration
consequences, 228 the Court held that current norms require counsel to
give accurate advice regarding deportation in light of a guilty plea to a
given offense. 229 In the end, the Court in Padilla required limited
expertise from criminal defense counsel: to inform her client if the offense
of conviction would lead to mandatory deportation, and if that issue was
unclear, to simply inform the defendant that the charges may carry
230
adverse deportation consequences.

223. Id.
224. HSA § 1512, 6 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
225. HSA § 1517, Pub. L. No. 107-296, title XV, § 1517, 116 Stat. 2311 (2002) (codified
at 6 U.S.C. § 557).
226. The only DOJ guidance on judicial removal concerns the Commissioner, and it
attaches a national contact list of INS agents. The Authors did find a case where the
defendant had asked the court to issue a judicial removal order, and the court denied the
motion and referred to the necessary agreement between the U.S. Attorney's Office and the
"Commissioner of Immigration and Customs Enforcement" without citation beyond 8
U.S.C. § 1228(c). United States v. Camacho, 738 F. Supp. 2d 240, 242 (D. Mass. 2010).
227. 559 U.S. at 364-66; see also Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017).
228. Padilla,559 U.S. at 364.
229. Id. at 369.
230. Id.
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Importantly, the decision in Padillarested on a truly limited inquiry
(whether the federal Controlled Substances Act 231 offense was an
aggravated felony). The current crop of immigration waivers, however,
touch on far more. Defendants are asked to waive, for instance, rights to
collateral attack, to appeal of standing orders of removal, to assert that
they have no fear of persecution or torture, to forego relief such as
withholding of removal, to challenge the basis for a prior erroneous
deportation, and to forego any right to release pending the decision. This
far exceeds the scope of expertise contemplated in Padilla.
The Court in Padilla acknowledged that most criminal practitioners
were not well-versed in the intricacies of the immigration code and
regulations. 232 Surely, the confusing array of matters being waived in
plea agreements now is well beyond the safe scope of Padilla. Most
criminal practitioners and district court judges would not be able to give
adequate advice as to defenses, litigation practices, and the bevy of other
immigration issues being waived. 233 Moreover, simply saying the offense
of conviction may lead to deportation-Padilla's apparent fallback
position for gray area immigration issues-would not satisfy the waivers'
concerns, as Padilla did not touch on procedures, defenses, and
alternative options at all. As a result, there is grave potential for another
ineffective assistance claim in the Padilla line based upon advice
rendered about the instant plea waivers.
Note that asking non-citizen defendants to waive their defenses in a
future, unspecified civil action is not the same as advising them that their
removability is clear. If the prosecutor asked them to sign a plea
agreement pleading guilty to the charges in the indictment and any
unnamed other crimes that might be charged in the future, counsel could
not meaningfully assist them in making that decision. Likewise, the
non-citizen defendants and their lawyer cannot decide whether to waive
defenses in future removal proceedings unless they understand the
grounds for removability and defenses to removal, including any asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT claims they might possess. Without a
full understanding of facts of the case and the law surrounding
deportability and defenses, a non-citizen defendant can neither
intelligently nor voluntarily decide to sign these waivers.
We conclude that this whole dilemma is largely obviated by allowing
an IJ to conduct hearings and make appropriate findings and orders. The

231. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
232. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.
233. The public defender appointed for the criminal case has no obligation, and normally
is barred from, separate civil litigation. Even privately retained defense attorneys normally
have insufficient expertise to assist on this civil immigration litigation.
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IJ is a subject-matter expert in the field. If non-citizen defendants waived
immigration challenges per one of these plea agreements, they may seek
to raise a Padilla-typeclaim before an IJ, arguing that they entered the
plea based upon a failure to advise or giving incorrect advice about
options available to them.
D. Ethics Rules ProhibitEnforcement of Waivers
Most criminal defense practitioners are not also immigration experts.
Indeed, learning the intricacies of the federal immigration statute, as
well as its profusion of regulations, differing practices between
jurisdictions, and varying case law between circuits, is a truly
challenging mastery. Courts have referred to immigration law as
"labyrinth."234 The United States District for the Ninth Circuit
commented that "[w]ith only a small degree of hyperbole, the
immigration laws have been termed 'second only to the Internal Revenue
Code in complexity."' 235 Moreover, the Supreme Court fashioned its
Padilladecision in recognition of the complexity of immigration law:
Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own.
Some members of the bar who represent clients facing criminal
charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed
in it. There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in
which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or
uncertain.

2 36

234. Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2008). Indeed, because it is such a
demanding field to master, courts took the unusual step of developing an ineffective
assistance of counsel doctrine (under the Fifth Amendment) in the civil context, applying it
to immigration practitioners. Id. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003);
Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2003); Granada v. Att'y Gen., 317 F. App'x
925 (11th Cir. 2009); but see Manalansan Cruz v. Holder, 321 F. App'x 280 (4th Cir. 2009);
Lopez v. Holder, 390 F. App'x 623 (8th Cir 2010); Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853 (8th
Cir. 2008). See also Emmanuel S. Tipon & Jill M. Marks, Comment Note, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings-Legal Bases of Entitlement to
Representation and Requisites to Establish Prima Facie Case of Ineffectiveness, 58 A.L.R.
Fed. 2d 363 (2011). Thus, inadequate or incorrect advice regarding these waivers could
potentially implicate ineffective assistance both under the Sixth and Fifth Amendments in
some jurisdictions. Further, ineffective assistance regarding removal proceedings could
constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting reopening. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i)
(2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(v)(4)(iii)(1) (2018); Murillo-Robles v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 88 (1st
Cir. 2016).
235. United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 295 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2002).
236. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.
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Because of the difficulty in mastering immigration, the Court limited
its Padillaeffectiveness of counsel holding to simply identifying whether
the offense or conviction statutorily mandated deportation.237
Although Padilla set a low bar standard for effective criminal
representation regarding immigration consequences, the expertise
required to properly advise a non-citizen defendant to waive rights to
removal relief is far more demanding. 238 Whether an offense mandates
deportation is determined by consulting established law; on the other
hand, whether there may be any of a myriad of potential defenses to
removal, asylum, reopening, and the like, requires intimate familiarity
with much of immigration law and practice in addition to facts well
beyond the scope of the criminal defense representation. Therein lies the
ethics competency issue.
Bedrock ethics principles prohibit lawyers from providing legal
representation in a field where they are not competent to practice. The
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1
(Rule 1.1) states that lawyers must "provide competent representation to
a client," defined as "the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." 239 Rule 1.1
requires a lawyer to meet the standard of care of practitioners in the
field. 240 Factors include not only the complexity of the subject matter but
also lawyers' relevant training and experience. 241 That means more than
knowing what to do-the lawyer must also be able to apply that
knowledge to the client's problem to give effective advice. 242 When the
client must consider waivers, the lawyer may not simply decline to
explain those waivers and what effect they can have. 24 3 Specifically,
causing a client to abandon a potentially viable claim of relief violates the
competency rule.244 Discipline is demanded where a lawyer "plunges into

237. Id. at 374.
238. The Court in Padillafound that mandatory deportation was clear from the statute,
hence the Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel standard is applied to advising
criminal defendants of this collateral consequence of guilt. This leaves open the possibility
of a second line of Padillacase law addressing when defense attorneys have to advise their
clients regarding unclear and far more abstruse impacts of waiving immigration relief.
239. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR AS'N 2010).
240. D.C. Ct. of App. Bd. on Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 101-01 (2005).
241. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2010).
242. Att'y Griev. Comm'n of Md. v. Narasimhan, 92 A.3d 512, 519 (Md. 2014).
243. Ala. Ethics Comm'n, Formal Op. 2011-02 (2011) (reference plea agreement waivers
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
244. D.C. Ct. of App. Bd. on Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 378-04 (2007).

880

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

a field in which he or she is not competent, and as a consequence makes
mistakes that demonstrate incompetence." 245
Given the complexity of immigration law, it should come as little
surprise that a number of state bar discipline cases involve lawyers who
are incompetent in immigration matters. In Narasimhan, for example,
the lawyer took on numerous complicated immigration cases-failing
and prejudicing .her clients miserably-leading to a suspension from
practice. She had never worked in the field, though she had twice applied
for naturalization for friends and had provided some clerical support to a
lawyer filing a family's petition. 246 In In re Handy,247 the attorney
attempted to help clients obtain permanent residency in this country,
represented two individuals in removal proceedings, and was to secure
work permits for a company's employees. Her training was no more than
taking some immigration CLE classes and two hours of Lexis courses.
248
In In re Howe, 249 the
She was suspended from practice for one year.
lawyer represented a couple (who had lived in this country twenty years,
had four children born here, one with severe disabilities) in removal
proceedings. His representation was so dismal, that despite specific
direction by the IJ, he failed to marshal needed evidence, resulting in
removal orders. Bar counsel asked for the attorney's suspension. 250 In
DisciplinaryCounsel v. Sporn,25 1 the lawyer undertook naturalization for
an immigrant married to a citizen and appeal of an asylum denial.
Despite being an active member of the American Immigration Lawyers
Association and handling immigration matters for decades, she still did
not competently represent these individuals. As a result, she was
suspended from practice for two years. 252
Note that most criminal defense attorneys have had even less
immigration exposure than the first three disciplinary cases cited above,
and precious few have the experience of the fourth example. These bar
complaint cases demonstrate that the field is far too complex for
neophytes to hazard providing legal advice. Moreover, ethics disciplinary
counsels clearly do pursue cases where lawyers provide inadequate
245. Narasimhan, 92 A.3d at 519. Notably, Narasimhanwas a case where the lawyer
tried to represent clients in immigration matters when she was not skilled in it.
246. Id. at 519-20.
247. In re Handy, II. Disp. Op. 01 SH 124 (Ill. Att'y Reg. & Disp. Comm'n), 2004 WL
964743 (2004).
248. Id.
249. In re Howe, Petitioner's Brief, 2013 WL 9924178 (N.D. 2013).
250. Id.
251. Disciplinary Counsel v. Sporn, No. FSTCV146024035S, 2015 LEXIS 2418 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2015).
252. Id.
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representation in immigration, resulting in suspensions from practice.
As a result, unless criminal defenders are truly experienced immigration
experts, they should not venture advice on immigration waivers.
Furthermore, prosecutors who require defendants to sign such waivers
(when counsel is not competent to advise about the impact the waivers
253
prohibits lawyers from
have) also transgress ethic rules. Rule 8.4(a)
254
inducing others to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Additionally, Rule 8.4(d) bars conduct "prejudicial to the administration
of justice." 255 A number of state bar opinions found that prosecutors who
included certain waivers (of raising ineffective assistance of counsel and
prosecutorial misconduct) in plea agreements were in violation of both
sections of Rule 8.4.256 Since prosecutors insist on including these terms
in the plea agreements-and because defense counsel is required to
257
explain the effect of any waiver terms in a plea agreement
258
prosecutors demanding immigration waivers also violate ethics rules.
E. Public Policy Prevents Enforcement of Immigration Waivers
Numerous problems and defects inherent in the plea-based
immigration waivers exist that should lead federal courts and IJs to
ignore, or attribute little weight, to them. Similar to assessing the
enforceability of civil rights release-dismissal agreements and other pleabased waivers, the courts should consider the voluntariness of the waiver
alongside the public interests at play.
259
offers guideposts to adjudicators asked to
Newton v. Rumery
evaluate the enforceability of plea-based immigration waivers. In
Rumery, the Supreme Court turned to contract law principles to consider
whether a defendant should be held to a waiver of civil rights claims
given in exchange for the dismissal of the criminal charges against

253.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2010).

&

254. Id.
255. Id.
256. E.g., State Bar of Ariz., Formal Op. 15-01 (2015); Prof'l Ethics of the Fla. Bar,
Formal Op. 12-01 (2012); Advisory Comm. of the Sup. Ct. of Mo., Formal Op. 126 (2009);
N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 129 (1993); Sup. Ct. of Ohio: Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances
Discipline, Formal Op. 2001-6 (2001).
257. Ala. Ethics Comm'n, Formal Op. 2011-02 (2011).
258. The ethics issues provide a clear basis to refuse plea agreements with immigration
waivers, to demand that U.S. Attorney's Offices remove those terms from their boilerplate,
and to pursue bar ethics opinions to stop this practice. What is not as clear is to what extent
prosecutors may have a Brady-type obligation to disclose to any defendant asked to sign
such waivers all information available to the prosecution and its agencies that would tend
to negate, mitigate, or create a defense to removal.
259. 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
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him. 260 The case presented a question of whether "the interest in its
enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
harmed by enforcement of the agreement." 261 The voluntariness of the
agreement was the first inquiry. 262 Key factors in this analysis included:
the sophistication of the defendant; whether he was in custody; whether
his counsel drafted the agreement terms; and whether he had ample time
to consider the deal. 263 Justice O'Connor also added to that list the nature
of the criminal charges and whether the court supervised the
agreement. 264 Assuming the agreement was voluntary, a court must turn
to the public interests benefitting from and compromised by the
agreement. Importantly, the prosecutor must be able to articulate a
legitimate reason why the waiver is necessary. 265
As argued above, the voluntariness of any immigration waiver must
be questioned. 266 An immigration waiver cannot be voluntarily and
intelligently entered unless there has been an assessment as to the
validity of the removal charges and any defenses being waived. The
clients in such cases are being asked to waive their right to fight
deportation in a future civil action, in addition to pleading guilty to
criminal charges. Given the limitations on defense counsel we have
already discussed, an IJ or federal court would be right to find the waiver
void on that ground alone. An involuntary waiver contravenes public
policy.
The public policy interests also point to waivers' unenforceability.
Until recently, DOJ found little prosecutorial interest in resolving a
non-citizen defendant's deportability as a part of the criminal case. 267
Both the administration's Executive Order and the AG Sessions
Memorandum have changed that position, 268 but neither offers clear
public interest goals aside from indiscriminately utilizing all means
available to deport millions of residents.

260. Id. at 392.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 393.
263. Id. at 394. These factors are standard considerations for assessing voluntariness.
See, e.g., Tillman v. Macy's, Inc., 735 F.3d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 2013) (enumerating factors the
court looks to in assessing whether a waiver of civil rights was entered into voluntarily).
264. Newton, 480 U.S. at 401-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
265. Id. at 398.
266. As noted by the Deputy Chief Counsel of the Los Angeles Division of ICE, stipulated
deportation waivers can be inserted into federal plea agreements at a time when a

defendant "is less interested in fighting removal than in litigating the prison sentence."
Ryan & Needle, supranote 180, at 112.
267. U.S. DEP'T JUST., CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL § 1929.
268. See supra note 8.
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On the criminal side, prosecutors will be hard-pressed to identify a
criminal justice interest basis for immigration waivers. Plea waivers of
constitutional and other statutory rights have long been supported by
goals of case finality. 269 Immigration waivers, however, do not address
the criminal charge or sentence at all. In fact, their inclusion in standard
plea agreements make the plea itself vulnerable to future challenge, on
ineffective assistance grounds among others, that may ultimately
frustrate the goal of case resolution. DOJ may argue cost savings, but the
270
Not
expenditures related to immigration adjudication is negligible.
every non-citizen defendant is going to have a claim for relief-in fact, it
may be a small percentage. The immigration waiver terms do not save
the government the cost of actual deportation. Neither does it save on
detention costs, given the availability of the Institutional Hearing
Program, which allows non-citizen defendants to have their immigration
271
court proceedings while they serve their criminal sentence.
Conversely, the public interest against the waivers is significant. The
United States' international treaty obligations bind the government not
to deport non-citizens to countries where they are likely to be tortured or
persecuted. The United States assumed these treaty obligations,
particularly CAT, as much to ensure the safety of United States citizens
abroad as to signal the nation's general commitments to human life and
safety. 272 Those responsibilities fall to every government actor, including
prosecutors. For a concern as important as immigration, public policy
supports having experts in that field to decide these tricky legal analyses.
In practice, should DOJ continue with these waivers, prosecutors and
judges will have to be certain that they are not violating their highest
duties. We doubt that the waivers, as currently employed, will be able to
give the government the assurances it needs.
In addition, there is public interest in upholding all aspects of the
immigration act, including when discretionary relief to non-citizens is
granted. Efforts to expedite removal through plea-based immigration
waivers risk removing non-citizen defendants who may qualify for relief.
269. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971); United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
270. In fiscal year 2016, Congress provided only $420 million to the Department of
Justice for the immigration courts as compared to $18.5 billion to DHS for immigration
enforcement. FY 2017 Budget Request At-a-Glance, DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/file/
821961/download (last visited Mar. 19, 2018); Reducing the Immigration Court Backlog and
Delays, HuMAN RIGHTS FIRST, https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRFBackgrounder-Immigration-Courts.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).

Will it Be Affected,
271. The Immigration Court's Institutional HearingProgram: How
4
TRAC IMMIGR. (Feb. 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/ 61/.
272.

See discussion supra note 76.
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Congress, in creating the U Visa for victims of violent crime who have
cooperated in a criminal investigation or prosecution, specifically granted
DHS the ability to waive most criminal history (even aggravated felonies)
where granting protection is in the public or national interest. 27 3 A push

for an immigration waiver in a plea for an unlawful reentrant, for
example, may have the direct impact of frustrating a separate criminal
investigation and justice goals there. DHS has also been found to err
repeatedly in its assessment of removability; thus, in a not insignificant
number of cases, DHS has wrongfully deported American citizens! 274 In
cases like those, public interest squarely falls on the need for a full
hearing before an IJ to determine relief and to verify the validity of DHS's
charges. The IMs must further be free to conduct their inquiry into both
removability and relief broadly, without immigration waivers limiting (or
even suggesting a limit on) their task.275

U.S. Attorneys' current practice of including boilerplate immigration
waiver terms in plea agreements (regardless of individual circumstances)
is additionally problematic. Later circuit courts in the Rumery line
agreed that blanket civil rights releases could not be enforced. 276 As a
result, even where the voluntariness of the plea and waiver is shown and
a prosecutor can articulate some important public interest at stake, the
prosecutor must individually assess the factual merits of each
defendant's potential immigration claims before balancing its interest
with the defendant's interests. 277 Likewise, a judge deciding to enforce a
federal immigration waiver must consider, in a case-by-case fashion,
whether the prosecutor (at the time of the waiver request) had
investigated the defendant's immigration defenses. At both stages, the
inquiry would be substantial. Public policy speaks strongly in favor of not
enforcing immigration waivers. DOJ should return to its previous and

273. INA § 212(d)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14) (2018).
274. Meredith Hoffman, The US Keeps Mistakenly Deporting Its Own Citizens, VICE
NEWS (Mar. 8, 2016), https://news.vice.com/article/the-us-keeps-mistakenly-deporting-itsown-citizens; see also Caitlin Dickerson, US Citizen Detained by Mistake Sues Miami-Dade
Over ImmigrationEnforcement, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
07/05/us/immigration-sanctuary-lawsuit-miami.html.
275. United States v. Maldonado-Ramirez, 216 F.3d 940, 944-45 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding the district court could not bar a non-citizen defendant from seeking relief from
removal as part of his criminal sentence).
276. See, e.g., Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 383 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding blanket
policy requiring all defendants participating in an alternative sentencing program to waive
civil rights claims unenforceable); Kinney v. City of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp. 2d 908, 91819 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (concluding release-dismissal agreement court not be enforced).
277. See Garcia v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2015) ("As DHS recognizes, it bears
the burden to establish a valid waiver by clear and convincing evidence.").
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well-reasoned positions that immigration matters are best left to the
immigration courts.
F. Waivers Violate InternationalLaw Obligations
A few critical removal defenses-asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under CAT-derive from international law and the United
States' treaty obligations. As discussed above, withholding of removal
and protection under CAT may prevent deportation for individuals who
will be tortured or killed upon returning to their homeland. The
international law source of those protections-the United Nations (U.N.)
CAT and the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Refugee Convention)-may both invalidate immigration waivers that
limit the ability of non-citizens to access the treaty provisions.
The United States has signed and ratified both the Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, through which the United States is bound to
follow the Refugee

Convention,

and the CAT. 278 The conventions'

respective non-refoulement obligations not to return non-citizens to
countries where they will be harmed appear in immigration law and
regulation. 279 The government cannot return a non-citizen to a country
to face certain torture or persecution. These protections are
280
non-discretionary.
The non-refoulement protections are of fundamental importance. The
prohibition against torture has reached the status of jus cogens in
international law, regulating conduct of all nations regardless of treaty
membership. 281 Scholars argue that the non-refoulement provisions in
both CAT and the Refugee Convention have almost reached, if not
282
already obtained, similar jus cogens status.

278. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N., July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150, acceded to by United States when it signed the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees art. I, U.N., Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. See Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N., Dec. 10, 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85; Signed in 1988, adopted by the Senate in 1990, and deposited by President
Clinton with the U.N. Secretary General in 1994. U.N. Doc. 571 Leg./SER. E/13, IV.9 (1995);
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-18 (2018).
279. Bill Frelick, "Abundantly Clear" Refoulement, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 245, 248
(2004).
280. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 419-20; Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 428 n.7.
281. MANFRED NOWAK & ELIZABETH MCARTHUR, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A COMMENTARY 8 (2008).

282. Alice Farmer, Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures
that Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 1 (2008). But see Aoife Duffy,
Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in InternationalLaw, 20 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
373 (2008).
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The commitment to protect non-citizens in the United States against
the severe harm they may face in their home countries is clearest under
CAT. The United States signed the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1984,
with Congress ratifying it in 1994. Its purpose is "to promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms." 283 It provides that "[n]o State Party shall expel, return
('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture." 284 Following ratification, DOJ issued regulations to
implement the non-refoulement. 285
In Khouzam v. AG of the United States,286 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit examined DHS's ability to act in light of the
treaty obligations. 287 Having established past torture and a likelihood of
being tortured in the future by Egyptian police, Mr. Khouzam had been
granted deferral of removal under CAT.288 One year later, DHS detained

Mr. Khouzam and prepared to deport him to Egypt on assurances from
the Egyptian government that he would not be tortured. Mr. Khouzam
challenged DHS's summary removal in federal court and secured the
right to examine and challenge the so-called "assurance" and to be heard
as to his continued fear of torture if forcibly returned to Egypt. 289

Khouzam makes clear that the United States cannot abrogate
non-citizens' right to challenge removal when they face torture or death
in their home country. 290 The state can also not engage in practices that
limit treaty protections. The U.N. Committee Against Torture, which
monitors the implementation of the CAT, has drafted guidance to state
parties on the treaty's non-refoulement provisions. Relevant here are two
comments-one prohibiting collective denials of protection without
affording an individualized assessment of the risk of torture to an
individual; the second prohibits use of strategies to limit protection, such
as prolonged detention of protection-seekers or limiting support services

283. CAT, opening paragraph 3.
284. CAT, article 3, paragraph 1.
285. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18, 1208.18 (2018).
286. 549 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2008).
287. Id. at 239.
288. Id. at 238.
289. Id. at 239, 259.
290. Other state parties to the CAT have similarly interpreted the convention. See, e.g.,
A (FC) et al. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't (2004) UKHL 56; Norris v. Gov't of the
U.S. (2010) UKSC 9 (appeal taken from [2009] EWHC 995 (Admin)) (UKHL); Att'y Gen. v.
Zaoui et al. [2005] NZSC 38 at [16].
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which may force a non-citizen home. 291 Consequently, plea agreements
that deny a defendant the opportunity to raise her reasonable fear of
torture, if returned home, violate the CAT and should be treated as void.
In 1967, the United States acceded to the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees through its Protocol, which mandates withholding
of removal for non-citizens whose "life or freedom would be threatened"
in their home countries. 292 Congress implemented the Convention's
non-refoulement provisions in the Refugee Act of 1980.293 Similar to the
CAT, the legal obligations to implement the treaty protection are
squarely on the state. Federal prosecutors cannot use the heavy threat of
enhanced criminal punishment to secure waivers of these international
protections.
Both conventions are treaties between countries, and the non-citizen
defendant is not in a position to relieve the government of that
international obligation. It is particularly troubling that through the use
of immigration waivers in plea agreements, an officer of the United
States seeks to contract away the United States' agreements under both
conventions. 294 The waiver policy makes clear that the United States fails
to honor its obligations with regard to non-citizen defendants by asking
them to waive any claims they could have under the Refugee Convention
and the CAT.
In the immigration field, withholding of removal and CAT protections
are constantly evolving and fiercely litigated. For that reason, only those
truly steeped in this field should handle assessments of relief. For
instance, how does a federal district court judge, prosecutor, or defense
attorney involved in plea negotiations know if a particular withholding
or CAT ground is viable? Each claim is intensely fact specific, often
requiring consultation of experts in other fields. Moreover, definitions of
critical terminology are not always clear. What may constitute torture in

291. UN Committee Against Torture, Draft Revised General Comment on the
implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22 (Feb. 2, 2017), at

TT 13-14.
292. Article 33: Prohibition of Expulsion or Return ("Refoulement'), UNHCR, http://
www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aal0.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
293. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat.101 (Mar. 17, 1980). See INA §
241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2018) ("[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to
a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion.").
294. Obligations of the "contracting state" includes all sub-divisions of the state and
anyone exercising governmental authority. Sir Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The
Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-refoulement: Opinion UNHCR, http://www.
unher.org/publ/PUBL/419c75ce4.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
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one circuit may differ in another. 295 There are many factual disputes
involved, along with the numerous legal uncertainties in definition. It
took the courts over a decade to reach a decision on whether domestic
violence can be sufficient basis for asylum and withholding. 296 The
definition of "particular social group" has also plagued agency
adjudicators and the courts since the passage of the Refugee Act in
1980.297 The subject is ever evolving. Even the understanding of "family"
as a particular social group has been disputed and is applied differently
in the circuits. 298 The lists of difficult issues go on and on, and sensibly
should be made by an IJ after a hearing, not by a blanket, often
inadequately informed, waiver.
In recognition of Torture Convention obligations, a federal judge
recently halted the deportations of more than 1,400 Iraqi nationals
(including all Iraqis with final orders of removal nationwide) who were
to be returned to Baghdad. 299 He did so because of changed
circumstances, Iraq having become too dangerous recently. 300 He thus
allowed those Iraqis the opportunity to reopen their cases in immigration
court and make claims based upon asylum or protection under the
CAT.301 This held true even for those Iraqis with prior criminal
convictions despite an INA provision against habeas corpus relief. 302 This
decision confirms that the United States' affirmative commitment to not
295. Compare Matter of S-V-, 22 I&N Dec. 1306, 1311-12 (B.I.A. 2000), with Afriyie v.
Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 937 (9th Cir. 2010).
296. See Matter of A-R-C-G- et al., 26 I&N Dec. 388, 395 (B.I.A. 2014).
297. Compare Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 232-34 (B.I.A. 1985), with Matter of
M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 227 (B.I.A. 2014).
298. Compare Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124-25 (4th Cir. 2011), with
Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 492-93 (5th Cir. 2015). See also Matter of L-E-A-,
27 I&N Dec. 40 (B.I.A. 2017).
299. See infra notes 301, 302.
300. Id.
301. Samantha Schmidt & Abigail Hauslohner, Detroit Judge Halts Deportations of
More Than 1,400 Iraqi Nationals Nationwide, WASH. POST (June 28, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.cominews/morning-mix/wp/2017/06/27/detroit-judge-halts-deportata
tions-of-more-than-1400-iraqi-nationals-nationwide/?utm.term=.209bfc9218cf.
302. Hamama v. Adducci, 261 F. Supp. 3d 820 (E.D. Mich. 2017). Most of these
non-citizens were subject to final orders of removal resulting from criminal convictions and
overstaying visas. The federal district judge noted that the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252,
divested him of jurisdiction but held that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to
petitioners in the extraordinary circumstances of the case at bar. Id. at 825. Relegating
petitioners to motions to reopen before the IJ, and then appeal of those motions to the courts
of appeal, would act as a suspension of the right to habeas corpus in violation of Kucana v.
Holder. 558 U.S. 233, 242 (2010) (characterizing right to file and prosecute motions to
reopen is an important safeguard intended to ensure a proper and lawful disposition of
immigration proceedings).
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send persons to their death, rape, slavery, or other persecution because
of their religious or political beliefs overrides an agency's desire to swiftly
execute a removal order. In the same vein, a prosecutor's interest in
imposing a federal immigration waiver seeking to bypass any
opportunity for a non-citizen to present a claim for protection must yield.
Consequently, the Refugee Convention and the CAT both bar the
United States from prohibiting non-citizens from raising their legitimate
protection claims. In particular, those international laws directly
prohibit the practice in at least five U.S. Attorney's offices of requiring
non-citizen defendants to admit that "he does not have a fear of returning
to the country designated in the previous order" or is not in fear of
persecution. 303 Attorneys in those districts should remove that language;
if contained in a plea agreement, any adjudicator (asylum officer, ICE
officer, IJ, or federal judge) should give the waiver term no effect
whatsoever.
CONCLUSION
An essential problem with immigration waivers in criminal cases lies
in hybridizing the two fields without having practitioners (defense
and federal district judges) sufficiently
counsel, prosecutors,
knowledgeable to manage it.
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that
deportation is not a punishment for having committed a crime, but it is
a civil penalty. 304 Perhaps it is time to rethink that notion. At least where
non-citizen defendants are subject to discretionary judicial removal at
their criminal sentencing and receive a sentencing discount for
acquiescing in the removal, it is difficult to maintain with a straight face
that this is not part of their criminal punishment. Some have suggested
merging the two systems in part and making the decisions of the federal
sentencing judge the exclusive route for resolving the immigration status
of non-citizen criminals. 305 As discussed above, there are a myriad of
serious problems with resorting to judicial removal, particularly where
the immigration defense and relief options require careful and nuanced
assessment of the immigration law. This is not federal judges' area of
expertise, and of course, such a resolution will not account for those
non-citizen immigrants who become "eligible" for deportation upon a
state criminal conviction.

303. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
304. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
305. See, e.g., Taylor & Wright, supra note 99.
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Alternatively, leaving the civil immigration system intact but
modeling it more closely on the criminal system, as some experts
suggest, 306 could be productive. On the prosecution side, ICE officers and
attorneys petitioning for removal could accept the role of "ministers of
justice," rather than law enforcement officers or removal advocates. On
the defense side, failure to provide immigration counsel to non-citizen
federal criminal defendants, in light of criminal defense counsel who are
handicapped in their ability to provide effective immigration advice
about removal relief to their non-citizen clients, could produce a Gideon
case for non-citizen defendants.3 07 Finally, on the judicial side, we could
"remove" IJs from the DOJ and place them in a separate agency to assure
308
impartiality and eliminate the appearance of impropriety.
Regardless of whether we accept the civil model of immigration
enforcement or move towards a hybrid or fully criminal model, the
current system should give us pause. Despite the staggering cost of
retained counsel and limited access to pro bono counsel, non-citizens, in
fact, win the right to remain in the United States in roughly 50% of the
cases in which ICE officers seek a removal order!309 Additionally, a fair
number ordered removed eventually win their case on appeal. 310 The fact
that the federal government is able to prevail in over 90% of its criminal
prosecutions despite facing defense counsel and the beyond a reasonable

306. Cade, supra note 62, at 5 (suggesting that DHS attorneys embrace disclosure
obligation, accept the responsibility and authority to screen and decline removal cases, and
initiate prehearing conferences).
307. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 235, 343 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires that counsel be appointed at no cost to the criminal defendant if he cannot afford
it). According to federal district court Judge Goldsmith in Detroit, in Hamama, 261 F. Supp.
3d at 827, motions to reopen an adverse deportation decision or to stay removal costs a
client somewhere between $5,000 and $10,000; if the motion is 'granted and a merits
hearing scheduled, the non-citizen can expect to pay additional fees of $10,000 to $30,000.
The case can reach up to $80,000. That fee is obviously out of reach of most non-citizens,
and if they have signed waivers of the right to contest removal, the cost of their fight will
certainly increase.
308. Bob Garfield, The Slow Crisis in America's Immigration Courts, WNYC,
https://www.wnyc.org/story/crisis-americas-immigration-courts/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2018)
(quoting Dana Keigh Marks, President of the National Association of Immigration Judges).
309. ICE Targeting: Odds Noncitizens Ordered Deported by ImmigrationJudge, TRAC
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court-backlog/apprepoutcome
2014),
(Aug.
leave.php. This figure is up from the 25% figure of cases in which ICE was unable to
convince an IJ to order removal between FY 2001 and FY 2010. See also ICE Seeks to Deport
the Wrong People, TRAC, http://trac.syr.edulimmigration/reports/243/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2018) (noting that the rejection rate for ICE removal requests increased to 31%).
310. Cade, supra note 62, at 37 n.186.
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doubt standard of proof,3
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while it loses almost half of its civil

immigration matters facing individuals without counsel in a proceeding
that requires only proof by a preponderance of evidence, tells us that
something may be amiss. These sobering statistics suggest that ICE and
federal prosecutors perhaps seek deportation orders when they should be
exercising greater discretion. Until some reform of the immigration
system is attained, the Department should refrain from forcing
non-citizen defendants to agree to immigration waivers in order to
receive lesser sentences in their criminal cases.

311. In 2010, 91.3% of people charged with a federal felony offense were convicted, either
by guilty plea or at trial, and 8.7% were acquitted or had their cases dismissed. See
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, Online tbl. 5.22.2010, ALBANY, http://www.
albany.edulsourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
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